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This paper presents new evidence on why unemployment insurance
(UI) beneﬁts affect search behavior and develops a simple method
of calculating the welfare gains from UI using this evidence. I show
that 60 percent of the increase in unemployment durations caused
by UI beneﬁts is due to a “liquidity effect” rather than distortions on
marginal incentives to search (“moral hazard”) by combining two em-
pirical strategies. First, I ﬁnd that increases in beneﬁts have much
larger effects on durations for liquidity-constrained households. Sec-
ond, lump-sum severance payments increase durations substantially
among constrained households. I derive a formula for the optimal
beneﬁt level that depends only on the reduced-form liquidity and
moral hazard elasticities. The formula implies that the optimal UI
beneﬁt level exceeds 50 percent of the wage.The“exactidentiﬁcation”
approach to welfare analysis proposed here yields robust optimal pol-
icy results because it does not require structural estimation of
primitives.
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I. Introduction
One of the classic empirical results in public ﬁnance is that social in-
surance programs such as unemployment insurance (UI) reduce labor
supply. For example, Mofﬁtt (1985), Meyer (1990), and others have
shown that a 10 percent increase in unemployment beneﬁts raises av-
erage unemployment durations by 4–8 percent in the United States.
This ﬁnding has traditionally been interpreted as evidence of moral
hazard caused by a substitution effect: UI distorts the relative price of
leisure and consumption, reducing the marginal incentive to search for
a job. For instance, Krueger and Meyer (2002, 2328) remark that be-
havioral responses to UI and other social insurance programs are large
because they “lead to short-run variation in wages with mostly a substi-
tution effect.” Similarly, Gruber (2007, 395) notes that “UI has a sig-
niﬁcant moral hazard cost in terms of subsidizing unproductive leisure.”
This paper questions whether the link between unemployment ben-
eﬁts and durations is purely due to moral hazard. The analysis is mo-
tivated by evidence that many unemployed individuals have limited li-
quidity and exhibit excess sensitivity of consumption to cash on hand
(Gruber 1997; Browning and Crossley 2001; Bloemen and Stancanelli
2005). Indeed, nearly half of job losers in the United States report zero
liquid wealth at the time of job loss, suggesting that many households
may be unable to smooth transitory income shocks relative to permanent
income.
Using a job search model with incomplete credit and insurance mar-
kets, I show that when an individual cannot smooth consumption per-
fectly, unemployment beneﬁts affect search intensity through a “liquidity
effect” in addition to the moral hazard channel emphasized in earlier
work. Intuitively, UI beneﬁts increase cash on hand and consumption
while unemployed for an agent who cannot smooth perfectly. Such an
agent faces less pressure to ﬁnd a new job quickly, leading to a longer
duration. Hence, unemployment beneﬁts raise durations purely
through moral hazard when consumption can be smoothed perfectly,
but through both liquidity and moral hazard effects when smoothing
is imperfect.
1
The distinction between liquidity and moral hazard is of interest be-
cause the two effects have divergent implications for the welfare con-
sequences of UI. The substitution effect is a socially suboptimal response
to the creation of a wedge between private and social marginal costs.
1 I use the term “liquidity effect” torefer tothe effect ofawealthgrantwhileunemployed.
The liquidity effect differs from the wealth effect (i.e., an increase in permanent income)
if the agent cannot smooth consumption perfectly. Indeed, there are models in which
the wealth effect is zero but the liquidity effect is positive because of liquidity constraints
(see, e.g., Shimer and Werning 2007).moral hazard versus liquidity 175
In contrast, the liquidity effect is a socially beneﬁcial response to the
correction of the credit and insurance market failures. Building on this
logic, I develop a new formula for the optimal unemployment beneﬁt
level that depends purely on the liquidity and moral hazard effects. The
formula uses revealed preference to calculate the welfare gain from
insurance: if an agent chooses a longer duration primarily because he
has more cash on hand (as opposed to distorted incentives), we infer
that UI beneﬁts bring the agent closer to the social optimum.
The approach to welfare analysis proposed in this paper is very dif-
ferent from the traditional approach of structurally estimating a model’s
primitives (curvature of utility, borrowing limit, etc.) and then numer-
ically simulating the effects of policy changes. I instead identify a pair
of reduced-form elasticities that serve as sufﬁcient statistics for welfare
analysis. Conditional on these elasticities, the primitives do not need to
be identiﬁed because any combination of primitives that matches the
elasticities leads to the same welfare results. In this sense, the structural
approach is “overidentiﬁed” for the purpose of welfare analysis, whereas
the method proposed here is “exactly identiﬁed.” In addition to sim-
plicity, the exact identiﬁcation approach has two advantages. First, it is
less model dependent. While previous studies of unemployment insur-
ance have had to make stark assumptions about borrowing constraints
and the lack of private insurance (e.g., Wolpin 1987; Hansen and Im-
rohoroglu 1992), the formula here requires no such assumptions. Sec-
ond, it is likely to be more empirically credible. Since one has to identify
two parameters rather than a large number of primitives, it is feasible
to estimate the relevant elasticities using quasi-experimental variation
and relatively few parametric assumptions.
2
I implement this method empirically by estimating the importance
of moral hazard versus liquidity in UI using two complementary strat-
egies. I ﬁrst estimate the effect of unemployment beneﬁts on durations
separately for liquidity-constrained and unconstrained households, ex-
ploiting differential changes in beneﬁt levels across states in the United
States. Since households’ ability to smooth consumption is unobserved,
I proxy for it using three measures: asset holdings, single- versus dual-
earner status, and an indicator for having to make a mortgage payment.
I ﬁnd that a 10 percent increase in UI beneﬁts raises unemployment
durations by 7–10 percent in the constrained groups. In contrast,
changes in UI beneﬁts have much smaller effects on durations in the
unconstrained groups, indicating that the moral hazard effect is rela-
tively small among these groups. These results suggest that liquidity
effects could be quite important in the beneﬁts-duration link. However,
2 The disadvantage of exact identiﬁcation is that the scope of questions for which it can
be used is limited. See Sec. II.E for a detailed comparison of the two approaches.176 journal of political economy
they do not directly establish that beneﬁts raise the durations of con-
strained agents by increasing liquidity unless one assumes that the sub-
stitution elasticities are similar across constrained and unconstrained
groups.
To avoid identiﬁcation from cross-sectional comparisons between dif-
ferent types of job losers, I pursue a second empirical strategy to estimate
the magnitude of the liquidity effect. I exploit variation across job losers
in the receipt of lump-sum severance payments, which provide liquidity
but have no moral hazard effect. Using a survey of job losers from
Mathematica containing information on severance pay, I ﬁnd that in-
dividuals who received severance pay (worth about $4,000 on average)
have substantially longer durations. An obvious concern is that this ﬁnd-
ing may reﬂect correlation rather than causality because severance pay
is not randomly assigned. Three pieces of evidence support the causality
of severance pay. First, severance payments have a large effect on du-
rations among constrained (low-asset) households but have no effect
on durations among unconstrained households. Second, the estimated
effect of severance pay is not affected by controls for demographics,
income, job tenure, industry, and occupation in a Cox hazard model.
Third, individuals who receive larger severance amounts have longer
unemployment durations. These ﬁndings, though not conclusive given
the lack of randomized variation in cash grants, suggest that UI has a
substantial liquidity effect.
Combining the point estimates from the two empirical approaches,
I ﬁnd that roughly 60 percent of the marginal effect of UI beneﬁts on
durations is due to the liquidity effect. Coupled with the formula derived
from the search model, this estimate implies that the marginal welfare
gain of increasing the unemployment beneﬁt level from the prevailing
rate of 50 percent of the preunemployment wage is small but positive.
Hence, the optimal beneﬁt level exceeds 50 percent of the wage in the
existing UI system that pays constant beneﬁts for 6 months. An impor-
tant caveat to this policy conclusion is that it does not consider other
types of policy instruments to resolve credit and insurance market fail-
ures. A natural alternative tool to resolve credit market failures is the
provision of loans. I brieﬂy compare the potential value of loans versus
UI beneﬁts using numerical simulations at the end of the paper.
In addition to the empirical literature on unemployment insurance,
this paper relates to and builds on several other strands of the literature
in macroeconomics and public ﬁnance. First, several studies have used
consumption data to investigate the importance of liquidity constraints
and partial insurance (see, e.g., Zeldes 1989; Johnson, Parker, and Sou-
leles 2006; Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston 2008). This paper presents
analogous evidence from the labor market, showing that labor supply
is “excessively sensitive” to transitory income because of imperfectionsmoral hazard versus liquidity 177
in credit and insurance markets. Second, several studies have explored
the effects of incomplete insurance and credit markets for job search
behavior and UI using simulations of calibrated search models (Hansen
and Imrohoroglu 1992; Acemoglu and Shimer 2000). The analysis here
can be viewed as the empirical counterpart of such studies, in which
the extent to which agents can smooth shocks is estimated empirically
rather than simulated from a calibrated model.
The distinction between moral hazard and liquidity effects arises in
any private or social insurance program and could be used to calculate
the value of insuring other shocks such as health or disability. More
generally, it may be possible to develop similar exact identiﬁcation strat-
egies to characterize the welfare consequences of other government
policies beyond social insurance.
The paper proceeds as follows. The search model and formula for
optimal beneﬁts are presented in Section II. Section III discusses the
evidence on heterogeneous effects of unemployment beneﬁts on du-
rations. Section IV examines the effect of severance payments on du-
rations. The estimates are used to calibrate the formula for welfare gains
in Section V. Section VI presents conclusions.
II. Theory
I analyze a job search model closely related to the models in Chetty
(2003), Lentz and Tranaes (2005), and Card, Chetty, and Weber (2007).
The model features (partial) failures in credit and insurance markets,
creating a potential role for government intervention via an insurance
program. I ﬁrst distinguish the moral hazard and liquidity effects of UI
and then derive a formula for the welfare gain from UI in terms of
these elasticities.
A. Agent and Planner’s Problems
Agent’s problem.—Consider a discrete-time setting in which the agent
lives for T periods, . Assume that the interest rate and the {0, …, T   1}
agent’s time discount rate are zero. Suppose that the agent becomes
unemployed at . An agent who enters a period t without a job ﬁrst t p 0
chooses search intensity . Normalize to equal the probability of ﬁnd- ss tt
ing a job in the current period. Let denote the cost of search effort, w(s) t
which is strictly increasing and convex. If search is successful, the agent178 journal of political economy
begins working immediately in period t.
3 Assume that all jobs last in-
deﬁnitely once found.
I make three assumptions to simplify the exposition in the baseline
case: (1) the agent earns a ﬁxed pretax wage of if employed in period wt
t, eliminating reservation wage choices; (2) assets prior to job loss
( ) are exogenous, eliminating effects of UI beneﬁts on savings be- A0
havior prior to job loss; and (3) there is no heterogeneity across agents.
These assumptions are relaxed in the extensions analyzed in Section
II.D.
If the worker is unemployed in period t, he receives an unemployment
beneﬁt . If the worker is employed in period t, he pays a tax t b ! w tt
that is used to ﬁnance the unemployment beneﬁt. Let denote the
e ct
agent’s consumption in period t if a job is found in that period. If the
agent fails to ﬁnd a job in period t, he sets consumption to . The
u ct
agent then enters period unemployed and the problem repeats. t   1
Let denote ﬂow consumption utility if employed in period t and v(c) t
denote ﬂow consumption utility if unemployed. Assume that u and u(c) t
v are strictly concave. Note that this utility speciﬁcation permits arbitrary
complementarities between consumption and labor.
Search behavior.—The value function for an individual who ﬁnds a job
at the beginning of period t, conditional on beginning the period with
assets , is At
V(A ) p maxv(A   A   w   t)   V (A ), (1) tt t t  1 tt  1 t 1
A  L t 1
where L is a lower bound on assets. The value function for an individual
who fails to ﬁnd a job at the beginning of period t and remains un-
employed is
U(A ) p maxu(A   A   b)   J (A ), (2) tt t t  1 tt  1 t 1
A  L t 1
where
J(A ) p maxsV(A )   (1   s)U(A )   w(s) (3) tt t tt ttt t
st
is the value of entering period t without a job with assets . It is easy At
to show that is concave because there is no uncertainty following Vt
reemployment; however, could be convex. In simulations of the model Ut
3 A more conventional timing assumption in search models without savings is thatsearch
in period t leads to a job that begins in period . Assuming that search in period t t   1
leads to a job in period t itself simpliﬁes the analytic expressions for , as shown by  s / A tt
Lentz and Tranaes (2005).moral hazard versus liquidity 179
with plausible parameters (described below), noncavity never arises.
4
Therefore, I simply assume that is concave in the parameter space Ut
of interest.
An unemployed agent chooses to maximize expected utility at the st
beginning of period t, given by (3). Optimal search intensity is deter-
mined by the ﬁrst-order condition
  w(s) p V(A )   U(A ). (4) tt tt t
Intuitively, is chosen to equate the marginal cost of search effort with st
its marginal value, which is given by the difference between the opti-
mized values of employment and unemployment.
Planner’s problem.—The social planner’s objective is to choose the un-
employment beneﬁt system that maximizes the agent’s expected utility.
He could in principle set a different beneﬁt level in each period. In bt
this paper, I restrict attention to the “constant beneﬁt, ﬁnite duration”
class of policies—policies that pay a constant level of beneﬁts b for B
periods: for and for . In practice, most b p bt   B   1 b p 0 t 1 B   1 tt
UI beneﬁt policies lie within the constant beneﬁt, ﬁnite duration class;
for example, weeks in the United States. The problem I analyze B p 26
here is the optimal choice of b, taking the duration of beneﬁts B as
exogenously given.
Let denote the agent’s expected unemploy-
t T 1 D p  (1   s) j tp0 jp0
ment duration and denote the agent’s expected
B 1 t D p  (1   s) Bj tp0 jp0
compensated duration, that is, the expected number of weeks for which
he receives unemployment beneﬁts. The planner’s problem is to choose
the UI beneﬁt level b and tax rate t that maximize the agent’s expected
utility such that expected beneﬁts paid, , equal expected taxes col- Db B
lected, : (T   D)t
maxJ (b, t) subject to Dbp (T   D)t. (5) 0 B
b,t
I solve this problem in two steps, the ﬁrst positive and the second nor-
mative. I ﬁrst show that the effect of unemployment beneﬁts can be
decomposed into liquidity and moral hazard effects. I then use this
decomposition to derive a formula for the optimal beneﬁt level .
5 b*
4 Lentz and Tranaes (2005) also report that nonconcavity never arises in their simula-
tions. They also show that any nonconcavities in can be eliminated by introducing a Ut
wealth lottery prior to the choice of . st
5 In the baseline welfare analysis, I take the initial asset level as exogenous. I then A0
analyze an extension that allows to be endogenously determined by b and also allows A0
for endogenous private insurance.180 journal of political economy
B. Moral Hazard and Liquidity Effects
To understand the channels through which UI beneﬁts affect search
behavior, ﬁrst consider the effect of a $1.00 increase in the beneﬁt level
on search intensity in period t: bt
  u  su (c ) tt p   .     b w (s) tt
Next, consider the effects of a $1.00 increase in assets and a $1.00 At
increase in the period t wage : wt
  e   u  sv (c )   u(c ) tt t p   0 (6)     A w (s) tt
and
  e  sv (c ) tt p 1 0. (7)     w w (s) tt
The effect of a cash grant on search intensity depends on the difference
in marginal utilities between employed and unemployed states. The
reason is that an increase in cash on hand lowers the marginal return
to search to the extent that it raises the value of being unemployed
relative to being employed. The effect of an increase in is proportional wt
to because a higher wage increases the marginal return to search
  e v (c ) t
to the extent that it raises the value of being employed. Combining (6)
and (7) yields the decomposition
 s  s  s tt t p   . (8)
 b  A  w tt t
Equation (8) shows that an increase in the unemployment beneﬁt level
lowers search intensity through two conceptually distinct channels. The
ﬁrst channel is the liquidity effect ( ): a higher beneﬁt increases  s/ A tt
the agent’s cash on hand, allowing the agent to maintain a higher level
of consumption while unemployed and reducing the pressure to ﬁnd
a new job quickly. The second channel is the moral hazard effect
( ): a higher beneﬁt effectively lowers the agent’s net wage   s / w tt
( ), reducing the incentive to search though a substitution w   t   b tt
effect.
6
6 Technically, itself includes an income effect because an increase in the wage  s / w tt
rate raises permanent income. Since UI beneﬁts have little impact on total lifetime wealth,
this permanent income effect is negligible in this context and reﬂects essentially  s / w tt
a pure substitution effect. The decomposition in (8) can therefore be interpreted as a
search model analogue of the Slutsky decomposition. The substitution effect reduces the
welfare gain fromUI,much as adistortionarytaxcreatesadeadweightburdenproportional
to the substitution effect.moral hazard versus liquidity 181
The decomposition above applies to a one-period increase in the UI
beneﬁt level. In practice, UI beneﬁt levels are typically changed over
multiple weeks simultaneously. For instance, if a beneﬁt of $b is paid
for the ﬁrst B weeks of the spell, as in equation (5), an increase in b
affects income in the unemployed state in all periods . In this t   B   1
case, the liquidity effect cannot be exactly identiﬁed by comparing the
effect of a lump-sum cash grant in period 0 to the effect of an increase
in b because the timing of receipt of income may matter when agents
cannot smooth consumption. Conceptually, this problem can be re-
solved by introducing an annuity that pays the agent $ regardless of at
employment status in each period . When this annuity t p 0, …, T   1
is used, it is straightforward to obtain the following generalization of
(8), as shown in Appendix A:
 s  s  s 00 0 p   , (9) FF  b  a  w BB
where the liquidity effect
B 1  s  s 00 p  F  a  a tp0 B t
is the effect of increasing the annuity payment by $1.00 in the ﬁrst B
weeks of the spell, and the moral hazard effect
B 1  s  s 00   p    F  w  w tp0 B t
is the effect of reducing the wage rate over the ﬁrst B weeks.
Empirical implications: heterogeneous responses.—The prevailing view in
the existing literature is that individuals take longer to ﬁnd a job when
receiving higher UI beneﬁts solely because of the lower private return
to work. This pure moral hazard interpretation is valid only for an agent
who has access to perfect credit and insurance markets. Since such an
agent sets for all t, the liquidity effect
  e   e   u v (c ) p v (c ) p u(c ) 0 tt
because an annuity payment raises and by ( s / a) F p 0 V(A ) U(A ) 0 Bt t t t
the same amount.
7 At the other extreme, a hand-to-mouth consumer
who sets consumption equal to income has . Since this
  e   u v (c )   u(c ) ! 0 tt
agent experiences large ﬂuctuations in marginal utility across states, the
magnitude of can be large for him. ( s / a)F 0 B
More generally, between the hand-to-mouth and perfect-smoothing
7 Intertemporal smoothing itself cannot completely eliminate ﬂuctuations in marginal
utility across the employed and unemployed states because unemployment affects lifetime
wealth. Hence, exactly equals only if insurance markets are complete.
  e   e v (c ) u (c ) tt182 journal of political economy
extremes, individuals who have less ability to smooth will exhibit larger
liquidity and total UI beneﬁt effects holding all else constant. To illus-
trate this heterogeneity, I numerically simulate the search model for
agents with different levels of initial assets. I parameterize the search
model using constant relative risk aversion utility (u(c) p v(c) p
) and a convex disutility of search effort (
1 g c /[1   g] w(s) p
).
8 I set , , , and per week.
1 k v[s /(1   k)] g p 1.75 k p 0.1 v p 5 w p $340
The asset limit is and (10 years). The UI beneﬁt L p  $1,000 T p 500
is constant for weeks. Finally, assume that the agent re- b p bB p 26 t
ceives a baseline annuity payment of in each period, a p 0.25w p $85 t
which can be interpreted as the income of a secondary earner. At the
median initial asset level of $100 and weekly UI beneﬁt level of b p
, this combination of parameters is roughly consistent with 0.5w p 170
the three key empirical moments used in the welfare calculation in
Section V: the average UI-compensated unemployment duration (data:
15.8 weeks; simulation: 15.8 weeks), the ratio of the liquidity effect to
the moral hazard effect (data: 1.50; simulation: 1.35), and the elasticity
of unemployment duration with respect to the beneﬁt level (data: 0.54;
simulation: 0.36).
The solid curves in ﬁgure 1 plot search intensity in period 0 ( ) s0
versus the UI beneﬁt level b for agents with and A p  $1,000 A p 00
, the twenty-ﬁfth and seventy-ﬁfth percentiles of the initial asset $13,000
distribution of the job losers observed in the data. As predicted, the
effect of UI beneﬁts on search intensity falls with assets: raising the wage
replacement rate from to the actual rate of reduces b p 0.05wb p 0.5w
search intensity by approximately 55 percent for the low-asset group
compared to 22 percent for the high-asset group. The reason for the
difference in the beneﬁt effects is that the liquidity effect is much larger
for the low-asset agent. To see this, let a denote the increment in the
annuity payment when , so that for and t   25 a p 0.25w   at   25 t
for . The dashed curves in ﬁgure 1 plot versus a, a p 0.25wt 1 25 s t 0
holding the UI beneﬁt b ﬁxed at zero. Increasing the annuity payment
from to reduces search intensity by 45 percent for a p 0.05wa p 0.5w
the low-asset group, compared to 7 percent for the high-asset group.
The liquidity effect thus accounts for the majority of the UI beneﬁt
effect for the low-asset agent, whereas moral hazard accounts for the
majority of the beneﬁt effect for the high-asset agent.
The liquidity effects are large for agents with low because they A0
reduce quite sharply early in the spell, either because of binding
u ct
borrowing constraints or as a precaution against a protracted spell of
joblessness (as in Carroll [1997]). Once agents have a moderate buffer
8 To eliminate degeneracies in the simulation, I cap the probability of ﬁnding a job in
any given period at 0.25 by assuming for . w(s) p   s 1 0.25moral hazard versus liquidity 183
Fig. 1.—UI beneﬁt and liquidity effects by initial assets. This ﬁgure plots simulated
values of period 0 search intensity ( ) for two agents, one with and the sA p  $1,000 00
other with . The model is parameterized as follows: utility A p $13,000 u(c) p v(c) p 0
with ; disutility of search for ;
1 g 1 k c /(1  g) g p 1.75 w(s) p v[s /(1  k)] s   0.25
for with , ; wage per week, asset limit L p w(s) p   s 1 0.25 k p 0.1 v p 5 w p $340
 $1,000, ; UI beneﬁt for , for ; annuity payment T p 500 b p bt   25 b p 0 t 1 25 a p tt t
for and for . Solid curves plot as a function of UI 0.25w   at   25 a p 0.25wt 1 25 s t 0
beneﬁt level b, ranging from per week to per week, b p 0.05w p $17 b p 0.95w p $323
holding ﬁxed . Dashed curves plot as a function of an increment in the annuity a p 0 s0
over the ﬁrst 26 weeks, holding ﬁxed . b p 0
stock of assets (e.g., ) to smooth temporary income ﬂuc- A 1 $10,000 0
tuations, liquidity effects become negligible even though insurance mar-
kets are incomplete. Intuitively, intertemporal smoothing is sufﬁcient
to make the gap in marginal utilities quite small because
  e   u v (c )   u(c ) tt
unemployment shocks are small on average relative to lifetime wealth.
9
In this numerical example, the heterogeneity in liquidity effects trans-
lates directly into heterogeneity in total responses to UI beneﬁts because
the moral hazard effect happens to be similar across the two ( s / w)F 0 B
agents. In general, however, may not be similar across agents ( s / w)F 0 B
with different asset levels. This motivates a two-pronged approach to
9 For shocks that have large effects on lifetime wealth (e.g., health, disability), the “li-
quidity” (non–moral hazard) effect of insurance could be large even for agents who are
not liquidity constrained.184 journal of political economy
identifying the relative importance of liquidity versus moral hazard ef-
fects: (1) estimate how the effect of UI beneﬁts on search behavior
varies across liquidity-constrained versus unconstrained individuals and
(2) estimate how the effect of annuity payments or lump-sum cash grants
on search behavior varies across the same groups. Combining estimates
from these two approaches, one can calculate the fraction of the UI-
duration link due to liquidity versus moral hazard. Before turning to
this empirical analysis, I show why this decomposition is of interest from
a normative perspective.
C. Welfare Analysis: Optimal Unemployment Beneﬁts
Static case.—To simplify the exposition, I begin by characterizing the
welfare gain from UI for a static search model ( ). In this case, T p 1
the social planner’s problem in (5) simpliﬁes to
˜ maxW(b ) p [1   s (b )]u(A   b )   s (b )v(A   w   t) 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b0
  w(s (b )) 00
subject to b [1   s (b )] p s (b )t. 00 0 0 0
The welfare gain from increasing by $1.00 is b0
˜ dW dt   u   e p (1   s )u(c )   sv(c ). 00 0 0 db db 00
Note that
dt 1   s 1 ds 00 p   b . 0 2 db s (s ) db 0000
Then it follows that
˜ dW ds b 00   u   e   e p (1   s )[u(c )   v (c )]   v (c ). 00 0 0 db db s 00 0
To obtain a money metric for the welfare gain, I follow Lucas (1987)
and deﬁne as the ratio of the welfare gain from raising beneﬁts dW/ db0
to the welfare gain of increasing the wage rate by $1.00. The marginal
welfare gain can be expressed as a simple function of the gap dW/ db0
in the marginal utilities between the employed and unemployed states:
  u   e ˜ dW dW 1   su (c )   v (c )   00 0 1  s,b   e p sv(c ) p   , (10) Z 00   e [] db db s v (c ) s 00 0 0 0moral hazard versus liquidity 185
where
bd (1   s ) 00   p 1 s,b 1   sd b 00
is the elasticity of the probability of being unemployed with respect to
the beneﬁt level. From equations (6) and (7), (10) can be rewritten as
dW 1   s   s / A   00 0 1  s,b p   .( 1 1 ) () db s  s / ws 000 0 0
This formula shows that the welfare gain from increasing b can be cal-
culated purely using estimates of the liquidity and moral hazard effects.
Since all the inputs in (11) are endogenous to , the value of b dW/ db 00
applies only locally. Given concavity of , satisﬁes W(b ) b* 00
. Hence, (11) provides a test for whether the beneﬁt dW(b*)/ db p 0 00
level at which the elasticities are estimated is optimal. The sign of
indicates whether the optimal beneﬁt level is above or below dW/ db0
the current level.
An interesting implication of (11) is that an analyst who assumes away
liquidity effects can immediately conclude that UI strictly reduces wel-
fare ( ), because he has effectively assumed  s / A p 0   dW/ db ! 0 00 0
that markets are complete. The optimal UI problem warrants analysis
only when there are liquidity effects. I provide intuition for this result
and the formula in (11) after generalizing it to . T 1 1
Dynamic case.—Now consider the general problem in (5), where UI
beneﬁts are paid at a constant level b for periods. As above, one B   T
can construct a money metric for the welfare gain from UI by comparing
the effect of a $1.00 increase in b with a $1.00 increase in the wage rate
w on the agent’s expected utility:
T 1 dW dJ dJ 00 { .   Z db db dw tp0 t
Let denote the fraction of his life the agent is employed. j p (T   D)/T
Let and denote the total elas-   p (b/D )(dD / db)   p (b/D)(dD/ db) D ,bB B D ,b B
ticities of the UI-compensated and total unemployment duration with
respect to the UI beneﬁt level, taking into account the effect of the
increase in t needed to ﬁnance the increase in b.
When , the effects of beneﬁt and tax increases on welfare depend T 1 1
on the entire path of marginal utilities after reemployment. In addition,
when , depends on both and D. These factors make the B ! T dW/ db DB
formula for more complex, as shown in the following proposition. dW/ db
Proposition 1. Suppose that UI beneﬁts are paid for B periods at186 journal of political economy
a level b. The welfare gain from raising b by $1.00 relative to a $1.00
increase in the wage is
dW 1   jD  ( s / a)F 1 B 0 B (b) p (1   r)   r   [(1   j)    j  ], D,bD ,b B {} db j D ( s / w) F j 0 B
(12)
where
  e   e   e   e Ev (c )   v (c ) BE v (c )   Ev (c ) 0,B 1 t 00 , B 1 t 0,T 1 t r p   ,   e   e Ev (c ) DE v (c ) 0,T 1 tB 0,T 1 t
and denotes the average marginal utility of consumption after
  e Ev (c ) 0,st
reemployment conditional on ﬁnding a job before period s.
Proof. The general logic of the proof is to write the welfare gain in
terms of marginal utilities, as in (10), and then relate these marginal
utilities to the moral hazard and liquidity comparative statics. See Ap-
pendix A for details.
The formula for when differs from the formula in dW/ db T   B 1 1
(11) for the static case in three respects. First, the welfare gain depends
on a new parameter r in addition to the liquidity and moral hazard
effects. The parameter r is an increasing function of the sensitivity of
consumption upon reemployment to the length of the preceding un-
employment spell, that is, the rate at which rises with t. The r
  e v (c ) t
term enters the formula because part of the liquidity effect arises from
the difference in expected marginal utilities after reemployment at dif-
ferent dates when . This component of the liquidity effect has to T 1 1
be subtracted out, because only the difference in marginal utilities be-
tween the employed and unemployed states matters for optimal UI.
Second, when , depends on a weighted average of B ! T dW/ db  D,b
and because is determined by both the time the agent spends   dt/ db D ,b B
in the UI system and the time he spends working and paying taxes.
Third, the welfare gain is scaled down by because UI beneﬁts D /D ! 1 B
are paid for only a fraction of the unemployment spell, reducing D /D B
the welfare gain from raisingb relative to the welfare gain of a permanent
wage increase.
Approximate formula.—There are two complications in connecting the
empirical estimates below to the inputs called for in (12). First, the
empirical analysis does not yield an estimate of r. Second, the liquidity
effect depends on the effect of a $1.00 increase in an annuity ( s / a)F 0 B
payment, but the only variation in the data is in lump-sum severance
payments—that is, variation in . A0
To address the ﬁrst issue, I use the approximation that the con-
sumption path upon reemployment is ﬂat, that is, that does not vary
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with t. This is an intuitive assumption because consumption reverts to
the present value of lifetime wealth upon reemployment, and unem-
ployment spells typically have negligible effects on subsequent lifetime
wealth. The ﬂat consumption path approximation implies . r p 0
To calculate the liquidity effect, I translate the effect of a lump-sum
grant, , into the effect of a B-period annuity, . When  s / A ( s / a)F 00 0 B
the maximum duration of beneﬁts B is relatively short, as in the United
States, it is plausible to assume that the borrowing constraint is slack in
weeks 0 to . The reason is that the agent maintains a buffer stock B   1
in case his spell extends beyond the B weeks (as veriﬁed by the simu-
lations below). Hence, a $1.00 annuity payment over the ﬁrst B weeks
is equivalent to a $B cash grant in period 0, since the Euler equation
holds and the agent can exchange money freely across weeks. Even if
the borrowing constraint does bind at some point before week B, the
short length of most spells suggests that a $1.00 annuity payment will
be approximately equal to a $B grant:
 s  s 00   B . (13) F  a  A B 0
To further simplify the formula, I assume that .
10 With these   p   D,bD ,b B
approximations, it follows immediately that (12) reduces to a simple
function of the effects of lump-sum grants and beneﬁt increases on
search intensity at the beginning of the spell.
Corollary 1. Under the approximations that (i) does not vary
e ct
with t, (ii) , and (iii) the borrowing constraint is slack before   p   D,bD ,b B
period B, the welfare gain from raising b is
dW 1   jD   BD ,b B p R   , (14) () db j D j
where the liquidity to moral hazard ratio
 s0  s0    B F  a B  A0 R {p .
 s  s 00  s  s B   00    A  b 0 F  a  b B
Quality of approximations.—How accurate of an approximation does
(14) provide for the actual welfare gain? I answer this question by com-
10 This approximation is supported empirically: the elasticity estimates in Sec. IV, which
measure “duration” as time between jobs, are similar to those in studies that measure
duration as time in the UI system (e.g., Meyer 1990).188 journal of political economy
Fig. 2.—Comparison of approximate and actual welfare measures. This ﬁgure plots the
marginal welfare gain of raising the UI beneﬁt level, deﬁned as the change in the agent’s
expected utility from raising b divided by the change in expected utility from raising the
wage by $1.00 in all periods. The solid curve shows the actual (numerically simulated)
value of as a function of b. The dashed curve shows the approximatevaluecalculated dW/db
using the formula in corollary 1. The simulation assumes and all other param- A p $100 0
eters as in ﬁg. 1.
paring the actual (numerically calculated) and approximate welfare
gains from raising the beneﬁt level using simulations with the same
parameterization as in Section II.B and . I compute the actual A p 100 0
welfare gain by calculating numerically and deﬁning J (b, w) 0
 WJ (b   1)   J (b) 00 p .
 bJ (w   1)   J (w) 00
I compute the approximate welfare gain by calculating ,  s / A 00
, and numerically and applying the formula in corollary 1.  s / b   0 D ,b B
Figure 2 plots the actual and approximate values of as a func- dW/ db
tion of the wage replacement rate . The ﬁgure shows, for instance, b/w
that the welfare gain of raising the UI beneﬁt level by $1.00 starting
from a replacement rate of 50 percent is equivalent to a permanent 3.5
cent wage increase. The welfare gain falls with b because is concave J0
in b: there are diminishing returns to correcting market failures. The
approximate welfare gain is very similar to the actual welfare gain, withmoral hazard versus liquidity 189
an average deviation of 0.2 cent over the range plotted. At all but the
lowest replacement rates ( percent), the approximate and actual b/w ! 15
measures are indistinguishable. The similarity is striking given how much
less information is used to implement the approximate formula than
the actual (“structural approach”) measure.
The approximation works well for two reasons. First, the consumption
path upon reemployment is quite ﬂat; for example, when
e {c } b p t
, and . As a result, r is close to zero
ee 0.5wcp $423.50 c p $423.46 02 6
( ).
11 Second, the borrowing constraint is slack for r p  0.002 t ! 26
when percent. Since beneﬁts are provided for only 26 weeks, b/w 1 15
the agent retains a buffer stock to insure against the risk of a spell
beyond 26 weeks. For instance, when , the agent enters week 26 b p 0.5
with $75 in assets if he is still unemployed at that time, even though he
could have borrowed up to $1,000. The annuity to cash grant conversion
in (13) therefore holds exactly for . When , the bor- b 1 0.15wb ! 0.15w
rowing constraint starts to bind in the fourth or ﬁfth month, leading
to a modest error in the annuity conversion because most spells end
before this point.
12
The welfare gain remains positive even at because of the b p 0.95w
stylized nature of the simulation. Allowing for private-market or informal
insurance mechanisms would substantially reduce the simulated welfare
gains, particularly at high beneﬁt levels. This sensitivity to modeling
assumptions is precisely the advantage of using the elasticity-based for-
mula in (14) rather than simulating the welfare gains from the structural
model, as I discuss below.
D. Extensions
Endogenous ex ante behavior.—The preceding welfare analysis assumed
that behavior prior to job loss is invariant to the unemployment beneﬁt
level. In practice, higher beneﬁts might reduce precautionary saving
and private market insurance arrangements. To understand how such
ex ante behavioral responses affect corollary 1, suppose that the agent
is employed at wage in period . He faces a (ﬁxed) prob- w   t t p  1  1
ability p of being laid off in period 0, at which point the problem spec-
iﬁed in Section II.A begins. With probability , the agent is granted 1   p
tenure and remains employed until T. The agent can purchase an in-
11 In this numerical example, is particularly ﬂat because the agent does not borrow
e {c } t
against future earnings while unemployed prior to week because of the risk that B p 26
the spell may extend beyond the UI exhaustion date. In the working paper version (Chetty
2008), I give a bounding argument showing that irrespective of the agent’s r ! 0.015
borrowing decisions.
12 If were empirically estimable, the approximate measure would remain ( s / a)F 0 B
equally accurate for percent. Hence, the only potentially nontrivial source of b/w ! 15
approximation error is the annuity conversion in (13).190 journal of political economy
surance policy that pays $z if he is laid off and charges a premium
if he remains employed.
13 The agent’s value function in period  1 q(z)
is
J (A ) p maxv(w   t   A )   pJ (A   z)  1  1  10 0 0
A ,z 0
A   q(z) 0   (1   p) Tv w   t   . (15) t () T
The social planner’s problem is to
maxJ (b, t) subject to pD b p (T   1   pD)t. (16)  1 B
b,t
Let us redeﬁne
T 1 dW dJ dJ  1  1 {   Z db db dw tp 1 t
and the fraction of time employed as . In Ap- j p (T   1   pD)/(T   1)
pendix A, I show that corollary 1 remains valid in this extended model
subject to one caveat: the derivatives and must be eval- ( s / a) F  s / b 0 B 0
uated holding the ex ante choices of and z ﬁxed.
14 Intuitively, en- A0
dogenous ex ante behaviors have no effect on the marginal utility rep-
resentation in (10) because of envelope conditions that eliminate
ﬁrst-order effects of these behavioral responses. The liquidity and moral
hazard comparative statics, however, are confounded by changes in ex
ante behavior, breaking the link between the ratio R and the gap in
marginal utilities between the employed and unemployed states. Con-
ditioning on and z when calculating the derivatives restores the link A0
between and the gap in marginal utilities. ( s / a)F /( s / b) 0 B 0
Thus, (14) holds with endogenous ex ante behavior, but the variation
used to estimate the liquidity and moral hazard effects must be chosen
judiciously. In the empirical application below, is estimated from  s / b 0
unanticipated changes in beneﬁt rules, making it plausible that ex ante
behaviors are unaffected by the variation in b. In other contexts, such
as cross-sectional comparisons of unemployment durations across states
or countries, ex ante behavioral responses may affect the elasticities.
13 There is still a potential role for government-provided insurance in thismodelbecause
private insurance may have a load, . Note that the private insurance q(z) 1 [p/(1  p)]z
policy considered here does not induce moral hazard because it does not affect the
marginal incentive to search. Allowing for private insurance policies that induce moral
hazard requires a modiﬁcation of the formula because of a ﬁscal externality problem. See
Chetty and Saez (2008) for an extension of the formula in (14) to this case.
14 If is estimated using the variation in severance payments and the annuity ( s / a)F 0 B
conversion in (13), the effect of severance pay on durations must be estimated holding
ﬁxed savings behavior prior to job loss.moral hazard versus liquidity 191
Stochastic wage offers.—How does allowing for uncertainty in the wage
offer affect the formula for ? Consider a model in which search dW/ db
intensity controls the arrival rate of wage offers, which are drawn from st
a distribution . In this environment, the agent chooses both and F(w) st
a reservation wage below which he rejects job offers (McCall 1970). Rt
The formula in corollary 1 still applies in this environment (see App.
A). The logic for why the result generalizes can be seen in three steps.
First, the envelope conditions used to write in terms of expected dW/ db
marginal utilities still hold because is simply another optimized var- Rt
iable. Second, the ﬁrst-order condition for search intensity in (4) applies
irrespective of the wage distribution, allowing us to relate the expected
marginal utilities to the comparative statics of search intensity as above.
Finally, using the approximation that the mean level of consumption
upon reemployment is ﬂat over time (analogous to the approx- r p 0
imation above), one obtains (14).
Although the formula for has the same form, more information dW/ db
is required to implement it empirically when wage offers are stochastic.
Changes in empirically observed job-ﬁnding hazards cannot be directly
used to infer the relevant changes in search intensity ( , )  s / a  s / b 00
because part of the change in job-ﬁnding hazards comes from changes
in the reservation wage. In Appendix A, I show that (14) can be im-
plemented when wages are stochastic using data on mean accepted
wages. The change in the mean accepted wage can be used to infer
how much of a change in job-ﬁnding rates is due to changes in search
intensity versus the reservation wage. Intuitively, the effect of UI beneﬁts
on the reservation wage will be manifested in changes in ex post ac-
cepted wages. Recent evidence indicates that UI beneﬁt levels have little
effect on wages and other measures of the accepted job’s quality (Card
et al. 2007; van Ours and Vodopivec 2008). In light of this evidence,
the empirical implementation of (14) in Section V—in which changes
in hazard rates are equated with changes in —is valid even with sto- st
chastic wage offers.
15
Heterogeneity.—The empirical analysis below reveals considerable het-
erogeneity in liquidity and UI beneﬁt effects. How does such hetero-
geneity affect the calculation of if the government sets a single dW/ db
beneﬁt level as above? Consider a model in which agents have hetero-
geneous preferences and asset levels and the government has a utili-
15 Aside from its implications for the link between search intensity and hazard rates, the
evidence on match quality effects has no bearing on the optimal beneﬁt level under the
revealed-preference test proposed here. It does not matter if the agent chooses to use the
money to consume more leisure or search for a better match. Conditional on and  s / a 0
, evidence on search outcomes matters for welfare analysis only if the preferences  s / b 0
revealed by choice are not those that the social planner wishes to maximize (e.g., because
of time inconsistency).192 journal of political economy
tarian social welfare function. Deﬁne as the aggregate marginal dW/ db
welfare gain from raising b relative to raising the wage rate for all agents.
Then has the same representation as in (10), replacing the mar- dW/ db
ginal utilities by average marginal utilities across agents (see App. A).
However, connecting the gap in average marginal utilities to the ratio
of the mean liquidity and moral hazard effects
 B # E( s / A) 0 R p
E( s / b) 0
requires additional assumptions. The reason is that agents with high
values of receive less weight in both the mean liquidity and moral
   w (s ) 0
hazard effects since their behavior is less elastic to policy changes. But
all agents receive equal weight in the welfare calculation under the
utilitarian criterion. If the heterogeneity in marginal utilities ( ,
  e v (c ) t
) is orthogonal to the heterogeneity in —that is, if the pa-
  e    u(c ) w (s ) t 0
rameters that control heterogeneity in preferences over consumption
and disutility of search are independently distributed—the terms
   w (s ) 0
cancel out of . Under this independence assumption, the formula for R
in corollary 1 measures the mean per capita welfare gain of raising dW/ db
b when calibrated using mean effects as in Section V.
E. Discussion
Intuition for the test.—The analysis above has shown that the optimal
beneﬁt level does not necessarily fall with , contrary to conventional  D,b
wisdom. It matters whether a higher value of comes from a larger  D,b
liquidity, , or moral hazard, , component. To the  ( s / a) F ( s / w) F 0 B 0 B
extent that it is the liquidity effect, UI reduces the need for agents to
rush back to work because they have insufﬁcient ability to smooth con-
sumption; if it is primarily the moral hazard effect, UI is subsidizing
unproductive leisure. In this sense, the formula for optimal UI proposed
here can be interpreted as a new method of quantifying the extent to
which the full insurance benchmark is violated. The agent’s capacity to
smooth marginal utilities is assessed by examining the effect of transitory
income shocks on the consumption of leisure instead of goods as in
earlier studies (Cochrane 1991; Gruber 1997).
More generally, the concept underlying (14) is to measure the value
of insurance using revealed preference. The effect of a lump-sum cash
grant on the unemployment duration reveals the extent to which the
UI beneﬁt permits the agent to attain a more socially desirable allo-
cation. If a lump-sum grant has no effect on the duration of search, we
infer that the agent is taking more time to ﬁnd a job when the UI
beneﬁt level is increased purely because of the price subsidy for doingmoral hazard versus liquidity 193
so. In this case, UI simply creates inefﬁciency by taxing work, and
. In contrast, if the agent raises his duration substantially even dW/ db ! 0
when he receives a nondistortionary cash grant, we infer that the UI
beneﬁt permits him to make a more (socially) optimal choice, that is,
the choice he would make if the credit and insurance market failures
could be alleviated without distorting incentives. The test thus identiﬁes
the policy that is best from the libertarian criterion of correcting market
failures as revealed by individual choice.
Comparison to alternative methods.—The most widely used existing
method of policy analysis is the structural approach, which involves two
steps. First, estimate the primitives using a parameterized model of be-
havior—for example, the curvature of the utility function, the cost of
search effort, or the borrowing limit. Second, simulate the effect of
policy changes using the estimated model, as in the calculation of the
actual welfare gain in ﬁgure 2. Wolpin (1987) pioneered the application
of this approach to job search; more recent examples include Hansen
and Imrohoroglu (1992), Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), and Lentz
(2008).
In contrast with the structural approach, the formula in corollary 1
leaves the primitives unidentiﬁed. It instead identiﬁes a set of high-level
moments ( , R, and ) that are sufﬁcient statistics for the marginal   D D ,bB B
value of insurance (up to the approximations necessitated by data lim-
itations). The primitives do not need to be identiﬁed because any com-
bination of primitives that matches ( , R, and ) at a given level of   D D ,bB B
b implies the same value of . For example, any primitives con- dW(b)/db
sistent with these three moments at in ﬁgure 2 would lead to b p 0.5w
. Changes in the primitives affect the marginal dW(b p 0.5w)/db p 0.035
welfare gain only through these three moments because of envelope
conditions that arise from agent optimization (see also Chetty 2006a).
Thus, the three moments exactly identify the welfare gain from UI.
The same concept of exact identiﬁcation underlies the consumption-
based formula for optimal UI beneﬁts of Baily (1978) and Chetty
(2006a) and the reservation wage formula of Shimer and Werning
(2007). Each of these papers identiﬁes a different sufﬁcient statistic for
welfare analysis. One advantage of the moral hazard versus liquidity
method is that it requires data only on unemployment durations, which
are typically more precise and widely available than data on consumption
or reservation wages. In addition, this method does not rely on con-
sumption-labor separability ( ) or a speciﬁc parameterization of u p v
the utility function and can be easily implemented when beneﬁts have
ﬁnite duration ( ).
16 B ! T
16 The formula here does, however, assume separability of utility over consumption and
search effort in the unemployed state. Complementarities between and can be handled cs tt
by estimating the cross-partial using the technique in Chetty (2006b).194 journal of political economy
The general advantage of exact identiﬁcation methods relative to the
structural approach is that they require much less information about
preferences and technology. For instance, (14) is invariant to assump-
tions about market completeness, as measured by the asset limit L and
the cost of private insurance . Structural approaches, in contrast, q(z)
often require assumptions such as no intertemporal smoothing or no
private insurance to operationalize the analysis. Moreover, even granted
such assumptions, it is challenging to identify every primitive consistently
in view of model misspeciﬁcation and omitted variable concerns. A bi-
ased estimate of any one of the structural primitives creates bias in the
welfare analysis. Since it is easier to estimate a small set of elasticities
using credible identiﬁcation strategies, exact identiﬁcation is likely to
yield more empirically and theoretically robust welfare conclusions.
The disadvantage of (existing) exact identiﬁcation strategies is the
limited scope of questions that they can answer. One cannot, for ex-
ample, make statements about the welfare gain from an indeﬁnite
( ) UI beneﬁt using the method developed above when the var- B p T
iation in the data is only in ﬁnite duration ( ) policies. In addition, B ! T
because the elasticity inputs to the formula are endogenous to the policy
itself, exact identiﬁcation can be used only to calculate marginal welfare
effects—that is, the effect of local changes in policy around observed
values. Structural methods, in contrast, can in principle be used to
simulate the welfare effect of any policy change once the primitives have
been estimated, since the primitives are by deﬁnition exogenous to
policy changes.
17
In the remainder of the paper, I calculate the welfare gain from raising
the UI beneﬁt level in the United States by estimating and  s / b 0
. I compare the results of this method with results of other  s / A 00
approaches in the existing literature in Section V.
III. Empirical Analysis I: The Role of Constraints
A. Estimation Strategy
The objective of the empirical analysis is to estimate the liquidity and
total beneﬁt effects for liquidity-constrained and unconstrained house-
holds. The empirical strategy follows from the positive analysis in Section
II.B; I essentially estimate the slope of the four curves simulated in ﬁgure
1. I begin by comparing the effect of UI beneﬁts on durations for
unconstrained and constrained individuals. This comparison gives an
17 In practice, structural estimation generally relies on out-of-sample parametric extrap-
olations to make statements about policies outside the region observed in the data. Using
such extrapolations, one could potentially extend the exact identiﬁcation welfare results
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indication of the importance of liquidity relative to moral hazard. For
instance, if the effects of beneﬁts on durations were much stronger in
the unconstrained group, it would be unlikely that liquidity effects are
large.
To implement this heterogeneity analysis, I divide individuals into
unconstrained and constrained groups and estimate beneﬁt duration
elasticities for each group using cross-state and time variation in un-
employment beneﬁt levels. The ideal deﬁnition of the unconstrained
group would be the set of households whose marginal utility is not
sensitive to transitory income shocks, that is, those that have D p
. Unfortunately, there is no panel data set that contains
  u   e u(c )   v (c )   0 tt
high-frequency information on both household consumption and labor
supply in the United States. I therefore use proxies to identify house-
holds that can smooth consumption intertemporally, which should have
as shown in the simulations above.
18 D   0
The primary proxy I use is liquid wealth net of unsecured debt at the
time of job loss, which I term “net wealth.” Browning and Crossley
(2001), Bloemen and Stancanelli (2005), and Sullivan (forthcoming)
report evidence from various panel data sets showing that households
with little or no ﬁnancial assets prior to job loss suffer consumption
drops during unemployment that are mitigated by provision of UI ben-
eﬁts. In contrast, households with higher assets exhibit little sensitivity
of consumption to unemployment or UI beneﬁt levels.
19
I also consider two secondary proxies: spousal work status and mort-
gage status prior to job loss. Browning and Crossley ﬁnd larger con-
sumption drops and higher sensitivity to UI among single-earner house-
holds. Their interpretation of this ﬁnding is that those with a second
income source are more likely to be able to borrow since at least one
person is employed.
20 The mortgage proxy is motivated by Gruber’s
(1998) ﬁnding that fewer than 5 percent of the unemployed sell their
homes during a spell, whereas renters move much more frequently.
Consequently, an individual making mortgage payments before job loss
effectively has less ability to smooth the remainder of his consumption
(Chetty and Szeidl 2007) and is more likely to be constrained than a
renter.
18 An alternative strategy, which I do not pursue here because of data limitations, is to
distinguish households by their ability to smooth consumption across states through risk-
sharing mechanisms.
19 Related evidence is given by Blundell et al. (2008), who ﬁnd that consumption-income
comovement is much larger for low-asset households.
20 A countervailing effect is that households with a single earner may be able to maintain
their prior standard of living more easily if the other earner can enter the labor force to
make up for the lost income. Browning and Crossley’s ﬁndings suggest that this effect is
dominated by the added intertemporal smoothing capacity of dual earners, so that on
net households with two earners are less constrained.196 journal of political economy
Although these proxies predict being constrained on average, they
are imperfect predictors for two reasons. First, some households clas-
siﬁed as unconstrained are presumably misallocated to the constrained
group and vice versa. Second, no household truly has because D p 0
insurance markets are likely to be incomplete. There is therefore a small
liquidity effect even among the groups classiﬁed as unconstrained, as
shown in ﬁgure 1. Since I attribute the entire response among the group
classiﬁed as unconstrained to moral hazard, both of these misclassiﬁ-
cation errors lead to underestimation of the liquidity effect relative to
moral hazard.
B. Data
I use data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)
panels spanning 1985–2000. Each SIPP panel surveys households at 4-
month intervals for 2–4 years. Relative to other widely used data sets
such as the Current Population Survey and the Panel Study on Income
Dynamics, the main beneﬁts of the SIPP are the availability of asset data,
weekly data on employment status, data on UI beneﬁt receipt, and large
sample size.
Starting from the universe of job separations in the pooled SIPP
panels, I restrict attention to prime-age males who (a) report searching
for a job, (b) are not on temporary layoff, (c) have at least 3 months of
work history in the survey (so that preunemployment wages can be
computed), and (d) took up UI beneﬁts within 1 month after job loss.
21
Details on the sample construction and SIPP database are given in Ap-
pendix B. The restrictions leave 4,560 unemployment spells in the core
analysis sample. Asset data are generally collected only once in each
panel, so preunemployment asset data are available for approximately
half of these observations.
The ﬁrst column of table 1 gives summary statistics for the core sam-
ple. Monetary values are in real 1990 dollars in this and all subsequent
tables. The median UI recipient is a high school graduate and has pre-
UI gross annual earnings of $20,711. Perhaps the most striking statistic
is preunemployment wealth: median liquid wealth net of unsecured debt
is only $128, suggesting that many unemployed individuals may not be
in a position to smooth consumption while unemployed.
Information on UI laws was obtained from the Employment and Train-
ing Administration’s Signiﬁcant Provisions of State Unemployment Insurance
21 Restricting the sample to those who take up UI could lead to selection bias because
the take-up decision is endogenous to the beneﬁt level (Anderson and Meyer 1997). I
ﬁnd that the elasticity of take-up with respect to the beneﬁt level is similar across the
constrained and unconstrained groups, suggesting that endogeneity is unlikely to be re-
sponsible for the heterogeneous effects estimated below.TABLE 1
Summary Statistics by Wealth Quartile for SIPP Sample
Pooled









Prior to or at Job Loss
Mean annual wage $20,711 $19,638 $15,971 $20,950 $26,726
Median annual
wage $17,780 $17,188 $14,346 $18,584 $23,866
Age 37.0 35.5 35.2 36.7 41.7
Years of education 12.1 12.2 11.2 12.2 13.1
Percent married 61% 64% 59% 60% 63%
Percent spouse




beneﬁts $166 $163 $152 $167 $184
Individual replace-
ment rate 49% 50% 50% 49% 47%
Mean unemploy-
ment duration
(weeks) 18.3 18.0 19.1 17.6 19.4
Median unemploy-
ment duration 15.0 15.0 17.0 14.0 17.0
Assets and Liabilities
Mean liquid wealth $22,701 $1,536 $502 $5,898 $87,912
Median liquid
wealth $1,763 $466 $0 $4,273 $53,009
Mean unsecured
debt $3,964 $10,008 $697 $1,752 $3,171
Median unsecured
debt $960 $5,659 $0 $353 $835
Mean home equity $31,053 $19,768 $12,866 $30,441 $62,663
Median home
equity $8,143 $2,510 $0 $11,794 $48,900
Percent with
mortgage 45% 46% 27% 49% 50%
Percent renters 39% 43% 61% 35% 16%
Note.—Table entries are means unless otherwise noted. Data source is 1985–87, 1990–93, and 1996 SIPP panels.
Sample includes prime-age males who (a)r e p o r ts e a r c h i n gf o raj o b ,( b) are not on temporary layoff, (c) take up UI
beneﬁts within 1 month of layoff, and (d) have at least 3 months of work history in the data set. Pooled sample size is
4,560 observations. See App. B for further details on construction of the sample. Individual unemployment beneﬁt is
simulated individual-level beneﬁt based on a two-stage procedure described in the text. Replacement rate is individual
beneﬁt divided by weekly preunemployment predicted wage. Unemployment duration is deﬁned as time elapsed from
the end of the last job to the start of the next job. Asset and liability data are collected once per panel, prior to job
loss for approximately half the sample and after job loss for the remainder. Liquid wealth is deﬁned as total wealth
minus home, business, and vehicle equity. Net liquid wealth is liquid wealth minus unsecured debt. All monetary values
are in real 1990 dollars.198 journal of political economy
Laws (various years) and supplemented with information directly from
individual states. Unfortunately, measurement error and inadequate in-
formation about preunemployment wages for many claimants make it
difﬁcult to predict each claimant’s beneﬁt level precisely. I therefore
use three independent methods to proxy for each claimant’s (unob-
served) actual UI beneﬁts. First, I use average beneﬁts for each state/
year pair obtained from the Department of Labor in lieu of each in-
dividual’s actual UI beneﬁt amount. Second, I proxy for the actual
beneﬁt using maximum weekly beneﬁt amounts, which are the primary
source of variation in beneﬁt levels across states, since most states replace
50 percent of a claimant’s wages up to a maximum beneﬁt level. Third,
I simulate each individual’s weekly UI beneﬁt using a two-stage proce-
dure. In the ﬁrst stage, I predict each claimant’s preunemployment
annual income using education, age, occupation, and other demograph-
ics. In the second stage, I predict each claimant’s unemployment ben-
eﬁts using a simulation program that assigns each claimant a beneﬁt
on the basis of the predicted wage, state, and year of claim. See Appendix
B for further details on the motivation for and implementation of this
two-stage procedure.
C. Results
1. Graphical Evidence and Nonparametric Tests
I begin by providing graphical evidence on the effect of unemployment
beneﬁts on durations in constrained and unconstrained groups. First
consider the asset proxy for constraints. I divide households into four
quartiles on the basis of their net liquid wealth. Table 1 shows summary
statistics for each of the four quartiles. Households in the lower net
liquid wealth quartiles are poorer and less educated, but the differences
between the four groups are not very large. As a result, UI beneﬁt levels
are fairly constant across the groups. In particular, the replacement
rate—deﬁned as each individual’s simulated unemployment beneﬁt di-
vided by his predicted wage—is close to 50 percent on average in all
four quartiles. This similarity of beneﬁt and income levels suggests that
differences in beneﬁt duration elasticities across the quartiles are un-
likely to be driven purely by differences in the levels around which the
elasticities are estimated.
Figure 3 shows the effect of UI beneﬁts on job-ﬁnding rates for house-
holds in each of the four quartiles of the net wealth distribution. Since
ex post asset levels are endogenous to duration of unemployment,
households for which asset data are available only after job loss are
excluded when constructing these ﬁgures. Including these households
turns out to have little effect on the results, as we will see below in themoral hazard versus liquidity 199
regression analysis. I construct the ﬁgures by ﬁrst dividing the full sample
of UI claimants into two categories: those that are in state/year pairs
that have average weekly beneﬁt amounts above the sample median and
those below the median. I then plot Kaplan-Meier survival curves for
these two groups using the households in the relevant net wealth quar-
tile. Note that the differences in average individual replacement rates
between the low- and high-beneﬁt groups are fairly similar in the four
quartiles.
These and all subsequent survival curves plotted using the SIPP data
are adjusted for the “seam effect” in panel surveys. Individuals are in-
terviewed at 4-month intervals in the SIPP and tend to repeat answers
about weekly job status in the past 4 months. Consequently, a dispro-
portionately large number of transitions in labor force status are re-
ported on the “seam” between interviews, leading to artiﬁcial spikes in
the hazard rate at 4 and 8 months. These spikes are smoothed out by
ﬁtting a Cox model with a time-varying indicator for being on a seam
between interviews and then recovering the baseline hazards to con-
struct a seam-adjusted Kaplan-Meier curve. The resulting survival curves
give the probability of remaining unemployed after t weeks for an in-
dividual who never crosses an interview seam. The results are similar if
the raw data are used without adjusting for the seam effect.
Figure 3a shows that higher UI beneﬁts lead to much lower job-
ﬁnding rates for individuals in the lowest wealth quartile. For example,
15 weeks after job loss, 55 percent of individuals in low-beneﬁt state/
years are still unemployed, compared with 68 percent of individuals in
high-beneﬁt state/years. A nonparametric Wilcoxon test rejects the null
hypothesis that the survival curves are identical with .
22 Figure p ! 0.01
3b constructs the same survival curves for the second wealth quartile.
UI beneﬁts have a smaller effect on durations in this group. At 15 weeks,
63 percent of individuals in the low-beneﬁt group are still unemployed,
versus 70 percent in the high-beneﬁt group. Equality of the survival
curves is rejected with . Figures 3c and d show that the effect p p 0.04
of UI on durations virtually disappears in the third and fourth quartiles
of the wealth distribution. Not surprisingly, the equality of the survival
curves is not rejected in these two groups. The fact that UI has little
effect on durations in the unconstrained groups suggests that it induces
little moral hazard among these households.
The secondary proxies conﬁrm these results. Figure 4a shows that UI
beneﬁts have a clear, statistically signiﬁcant effect on job-ﬁnding rates
among households that are paying off mortgages prior to job loss. In
contrast, ﬁgure 4b shows that the effect is smaller for households that
22 The nonparametric test is conducted on the raw data because adjusting for the seam
effect requires a parametric assumption about the hazard rate.Fig. 3.—Effect of UI beneﬁts on durations. a, Lowest quartile of net wealth. b, Second
quartile of net wealth. c, Third quartile of net wealth. d, Highest quartile of net wealth.
The sample for panels a and b consists of observations in the core SIPP sample for which
preunemployment wealth data are available. See table 1 for the deﬁnition of the core
sample and the deﬁnition of net liquid wealth. Each panel plots Kaplan-Meier survival
curves for two groups of individuals: those in state/year pairs with average weekly beneﬁt
amounts below the sample mean and those in state/year pairs with weekly beneﬁt amounts
above the mean. The mean replacement rate is the average individual-level predicted
beneﬁt divided by wage for observations in the relevant group. Survival curves are adjusted
for a seam effect by ﬁtting a Cox model with a seam dummy and recovering baseline
hazards.moral hazard versus liquidity 201
Fig. 3( Continued)
are not paying off mortgages and are hence less constrained.
23 Results
are similar for the spousal work proxy: UI beneﬁts have a much larger
23 In contrast with the other proxies, the constrained types in this speciﬁcation (home-
owners with mortgages) have higher income, education, and wealth than the uncon-
strained types, who are primarily renters. This makes it somewhat less likely that the
differences in the beneﬁt elasticity of duration across constrained and unconstrained
groups are spuriously driven by other differences across the groups such as income or
education.Fig. 4.—Effect of UI beneﬁts on durations. a, Householdswith mortgages.b,Households
without mortgages. These ﬁgures are constructed in the same way as ﬁgs. 3a and b. Panel
a includes households that make mortgage payments; panel b includes all others. Only
observations with mortgage data prior to job loss are included.moral hazard versus liquidity 203
effect on job-ﬁnding hazards for single-earner families than for dual-
earner families (see Chetty 2005, ﬁg. 2).
The preceding results show that the interaction effect of UI beneﬁts
and wealth (or other proxies) on durations is negative. An alternative
approach to evaluating the importance of liquidity is to study the direct
effect of the cross-sectional variation in wealth on durations, testing in
particular if durations are an increasing and concave function of wealth.
I focus on the variation in UI beneﬁts because changes in UI laws are
credibly exogenous to individuals’ preferences. In contrast, conditional
on demographics and income, cross-sectional variation in wealth hold-
ings arises from heterogeneity in tastes for savings, confounding the
effect of wealth on duration in the cross section. For example, UI claim-
ants with higher assets are also likely to have lower discount rates or
higher anticipated expenses (e.g., college tuition payments), and hence
may be reluctant to deplete their assets to ﬁnance a longer spell of
unemployment.
24 In practice, I ﬁnd no robust relationship between as-
sets and unemployment durations in the cross section (as indicated by
the mean durations by quartile reported in table 1), consistent with the
results of Lentz (2008). This ﬁnding underscores the importance of
using exogenous variation such as UI beneﬁts for identiﬁcation. The
same issue also motivates the use of severance pay as a source of variation
in wealth to identify the liquidity effect in Section IV.
2. Hazard Model Estimates
I evaluate the robustness of the graphical results by estimating a set of
Cox hazard models in table 2. Let denote the unemployment exit hi,t
hazard rate for individual i in week t of an unemployment spell, the at
“baseline” hazard rate in week t, the unemployment beneﬁt level for bi
individual i, and a set of controls. Throughout, I censor durations Xi,t
at 50 weeks to reduce the inﬂuence of outliers and focus on search
behavior in the year after job loss.
Since the welfare gain formula (14) calls for estimates of the effect
of UI beneﬁts on search behavior at the beginning of the spell
( ), I estimate hazard models of the following form:  s / b 0
logh p a   b logb   b t #logb   b X . (17) i,tt 1 i 2 i 3 i,t
Here, the coefﬁcient b1 gives the elasticity of the hazard rate with respect
to UI beneﬁts at the beginning of the spell ( ) because the inter- t p 0
action term captures any time-varying effect of UI beneﬁts on t #logbi
24 More generally, wealthier individuals may have unobserved characteristics (e.g., skills,











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.206 journal of political economy
hazards. Note that the search model does not make a clear prediction
about the sign of b2. The effect of UI beneﬁts could diminish over time
( ) because the number of weeks for which beneﬁts remain avail- b ! 0 2
able is falling. But b2 could also be positive because households are
increasingly constrained and thus more sensitive to cash on hand late
in the spell. In practice, there is no robust, statistically signiﬁcant pattern
in the b2 coefﬁcients across the quartiles, and I therefore do not report
them in table 2 in the interest of space.
25
I ﬁrst estimate (17) on the full sample to identify the unconditional
effect of UI on the hazard rate. In this speciﬁcation, as in most others,
I use the average UI beneﬁt level in the individual’s state/year pair to
proxy for in light of the measurement error issues discussed above. bi
This speciﬁcation includes the following controls: state, year, industry,
and occupation ﬁxed effects; a 10-piece log-linear spline for the claim-
ant’s preunemployment wage; linear controls for total (illiquid   liquid)
wealth, age, and education; and dummies for marital status and being
on the seam between interviews to adjust for the seam effect. Standard
errors in this and all subsequent speciﬁcations are clustered by state.
The estimate in column 1 of table 2 indicates that a 10 percent increase
in the UI beneﬁt rate reduces the hazard rate by 5.3 percent in the
pooled sample, consistent with the estimates of prior studies. The es-
timate of (standard error 0.008), indicating that there is no b p 0.001 2
detectable variation in the UI beneﬁt effect over the spell.
To examine the heterogeneity of the UI effect, I estimate separate
coefﬁcients for each of the four quartiles of the net wealth distribution.
These speciﬁcations include all households for which asset data are
available either before or after the spell. Consistent with the graphical
evidence, the estimates are similar (but less precise) if only households
with ex ante asset data are included.
Let denote an indicator variable that is one if agent i belongs to Q i,j
quartile j of the wealth distribution. Let denote the baseline job- at,j
ﬁnding hazard for individuals in quartile j in week s of the unemploy-
ment spell. Columns 2–5 of table 2 report estimates of from
j {b } 1 jp1,2,3,4
the following stratiﬁed Cox model:
jj logh p a   b Q logb   b Q (t #logb)   b X . (18) itj t,j 1 i,ji 2 i,ji 3 itj
In this equation, corresponds to the elasticity of the hazard rate with
j b1
respect to UI beneﬁts at in quartile j of the net wealth distribution. t p 0
Speciﬁcation 2 of table 2 reports estimates of (18) with no controls (no
X). The effect of UI beneﬁts declines monotonically with net wealth.
25 The only stable pattern across the speciﬁcations is that b2 is slightly negative in the
highest wealth quartile (around  0.03). The reason could be that households that are
initially unconstrained become increasingly liquidity constrained as they deplete their
buffer stocks.moral hazard versus liquidity 207
Among households in the lowest quartile of net wealth, a 10 percent
increase in UI beneﬁts reduces the hazard rate by 7.2 percent. In con-
trast, there is a much weaker association between the level of UI beneﬁts
and the hazard among households in the third and fourth quartiles of
net wealth. The null hypothesis that UI beneﬁts have the same effect
on hazard rates in the ﬁrst and fourth quartiles is rejected with p !
, as is the null hypothesis that the mean UI effect for households 0.05
with below-median wealth is the same as that for households with above-
median wealth.
Speciﬁcation 3 replicates 2 with the full set of controls used in column
1, including state and year ﬁxed effects so that the coefﬁcients are
identiﬁed from changes in UI laws within states rather than cross-state
comparisons. This speciﬁcation also includes interactions of the wage
spline and industry/occupation dummies with the wealth quartile in-
dicators, allowing these variables to have different effects across the
quartiles. The pattern of the coefﬁcients is unchanged, but the mag-
nitudes of the coefﬁcients in the ﬁrst three quartiles is larger, perhaps
because exogenous changes in UI laws are more effectively isolated when
the controls are included.
In speciﬁcations 4 and 5, I explore robustness to changes in the
deﬁnition of . Both of these speciﬁcations include the control set used bi
in speciﬁcation 3. Column 4 uses the maximum UI beneﬁt level in
individual i’s state/year and column 5 uses the simulated beneﬁt for
each individual i using the two-stage procedure described above. In the
maximum beneﬁt speciﬁcation, the coefﬁcient estimates are all smaller
than their counterparts in speciﬁcation 3, but the pattern is preserved:
the effect of beneﬁts is larger for low-wealth individuals, and the hy-
pothesis tests of equivalent effects in the lower and upper quartiles are
both rejected with . In the individual simulated beneﬁt speci- p ! 0.01
ﬁcation, UI beneﬁts are estimated to have little effect on durations in
the highest wealth quartile, and the elasticity estimates are declining in
quartiles 2–4. However, the estimate for the ﬁrst quartile is smaller than
that in the second quartile, breaking the monotonic declining pattern
obtained with the other measures of beneﬁts.
I have estimated a set of speciﬁcations analogous to (18) for the
spousal work and mortgage proxies. An example is in column 6 of table
2, which reports estimates of the effect of UI beneﬁts on job-ﬁnding
hazards for households with and without a mortgage prior to job loss.
This speciﬁcation includes the same controls as in column 3, except
that the relevant covariates are interacted with the mortgage indicator
rather than with the asset quartiles. The estimates indicate that beneﬁts
have a considerably larger effect on durations among households that
have mortgages. See table 3 in Chetty (2005) for additional estimates
using the spousal work and mortgage proxies.208 journal of political economy
I have also ﬁt a variety of other speciﬁcations to further probe the
robustness of the results (Chetty 2005, table 2b). The estimates are
similar when high-income individuals are excluded or temporary layoffs
are included. Results are also similar with controls for the average wage
income in each state and year from the Bureau of Labor Statistics or
when the wealth quartiles are deﬁned in terms of wealth divided by
wages. In contrast to liquid wealth, I ﬁnd no systematic link between
home equity and the beneﬁt duration elasticity. This is consistent with
the importance of liquidity, since accessing home equity is difﬁcult when
one is unemployed (Hurst and Stafford 2004). Finally, I ﬁnd no rela-
tionship between the level of beneﬁts and durations for a control group
of individuals who do not receive UI. This “placebo test” supports the
identiﬁcation assumption that the variation in UI beneﬁts is orthogonal
to unobservable determinants of durations.
In summary, the SIPP data indicate that the link between unemploy-
ment beneﬁts and durations documented in earlier studies is driven by
a subset of the population that has limited ability to smooth consump-
tion. This pattern is suggestive of a substantial liquidity effect. As shown
in ﬁgure 1, if one were to assume that substitution effects, , ( s / w)F 0 B
are similar across unconstrained and constrained groups, this evidence
would be sufﬁcient to infer that liquidity effects are large. However, this
assumption may be untenable: constrained households might have dif-
ferent preferences (locally or globally) that generate larger substitution
effects than unconstrained households. I therefore turn to a second
empirical strategy to identify the magnitude of the liquidity effect.
IV. Empirical Analysis II: Severance Pay and Durations
A. Estimation Strategy
The ideal way to estimate the liquidity effect would be a randomized
experiment in which some job losers are given lump-sum grants or
annuity payments but others are not. Lacking such an experiment, I
exploit variation in severance pay policies across ﬁrms in the United
States.
26 Severance payments are made either as lump-sum grants at the
time of job loss or in the form of salary continuation (short-duration
26 Receipt of severance pay intended to supplement UI beneﬁts typically does not affect
eligibility for UI, although some states can delay beneﬁts if the claimant receives “wages
in lieu of notice” (Kodrzycki 1998; McCulloch 1998). In Pennsylvania, the unemployment
compensation law explicitly states that severance pay does not affect UI beneﬁts (Penn-
sylvania Department of Labor and Industry 2007). Restricting the analysis to the Penn-
sylvania data set below yields results similar to those obtained for the pooled sample.moral hazard versus liquidity 209
annuities).
27 All severance packages are unconditional payments that do
not distort marginal incentives to search for a new job. Thus, any causal
effect of severance pay on unemployment durations reﬂects a pure li-
quidity effect.
The most common severance policy is one week of wages per year of
service at the ﬁrm. Some companies have ﬂatter or steeper proﬁles with
respect to job tenure, and others make no severance payments at all
(Lee Hecht Harrison 2001). Many companies have minimum job tenure
thresholds to be eligible for severance pay, ranging from 3 to 5 years.
There is little variation in severance packages within a given ﬁrm and
tenure bracket. Hence, conditional on tenure, the variation in receipt
of severance pay is driven primarily by differences in policies across
ﬁrms.
I estimate the effect of severance pay using hazard models similar to
those above:
logh p a   v sev   v sev # t   gX , (19) i,tt 1 i 2 ii ,t
where sevi is an indicator for receipt of severance pay. The coefﬁcient
v1 identiﬁes the effect of cash grants on job-ﬁnding hazards at the be-
ginning of the spell if receipt of severance pay is orthogonal to other
determinants of durations. After estimating the baseline model, I eval-
uate this orthogonality condition.
B. Data
The data for this portion of the study come from two surveys conducted
by Mathematica on behalf of the Department of Labor. The data sets
contain information on unemployment durations, demographic char-
acteristics, and data on receipt of severance pay. The ﬁrst data set is a
representative sample of job losers in Pennsylvania in 1991. The second
data set is a sample of unemployment durations in 25 states in 1998
that oversamples UI exhaustees. I reweight the data using the sampling
weights to obtain estimates for a representative sample of job losers.
For comparability to the preceding results, I make the same exclusions
after pooling the two data sets. I include only prime-age males and
discard all individuals who expected a recall at the time of layoff (in-
cluding temporary layoffs does not affect the results, as above). These
exclusions leave 2,441 individuals in the sample, of whom 471 (18 per-
cent) report receiving a severance payment. Details on the Mathematica
data sets and sample construction are given in Appendix C.
27 Since the form of the severance payment cannot be determined in the data, I treat
all severance payments as cash grants. To the extent that the severance is paid as salary
continuation, the formula for in corollary 1 will be more accurate because there dW/db
is less reliance on the approximate annuity conversion in (13).210 journal of political economy
TABLE 3






Prior to or at Job Loss
Mean annual wage $28,149 $26,213 $37,174
Median annual wage $20,848 $19,347 $30,693
Age 36.2 35.2 40.6
Percent dropouts 14% 15% 6%
Percent college graduates 17% 13% 34%
Percent married 58% 56% 68%
Mean job tenure (years) 4.5 3.8 8.1
Median job tenure (years) 1.9 1.5 4.8
After Layoff
Weekly unemployment beneﬁts $198 $190 $236
Replacement rate 49% 51% 43%
Mean unemployment duration 24.3 24.0 25.6
Median unemployment duration 20.0 20.0 22.0
Mean compensated duration 15.8 15.3 18.2
Median compensated duration 16.0 16.0 20.0
Note.—Table entries are means unless otherwise noted. Dataare from surveys of joblosersconductedbyMathematica.
Sample includes prime-age male UI claimants who are not on temporary layoff. Pooled sample size is 2,441 observations.
See App. C for details. Data are reweighted using sampling probabilities to yield estimates for a representative sample
of job losers. Preunemployment job tenure is the number of years spent working at the ﬁrm from which the worker
was laid off. Weekly unemployment beneﬁt is actual individual beneﬁt based on UI records. Replacement rate is weekly
beneﬁt times 52 divided by annual wage. Unemployment duration is time elapsed from the end of the last job to the
start of the next job. Compensated duration is weeks of UI collected. All monetary values are in real 1990 dollars.
Two measures of “unemployment duration” are available in these data
sets: (1) an administrative record of the number of weeks for which UI
beneﬁts were paid and (2) the number of weeks from the end date of
the individual’s previous job to the (self-reported) start of the next job.
For consistency with the SIPP estimates, I focus on the second measure
here. Results are similar, and more precisely estimated, using the ad-
ministrative measure.
Table 3 shows summary statistics for severance pay recipients and
nonrecipients. The sample generally looks quite similar on observables
to the SIPP sample used above. Given the minimum tenure eligibility
requirement, it is not surprising that severance pay recipients have much
higher median job tenures than nonrecipients. Correspondingly, sev-
erance pay recipients are older and higher in observable characteristics
than nonrecipients. These differences underscore why one must be care-
ful in drawing causal inferences from comparing severance pay recipi-
ents and nonrecipients.
C. Results
I begin again with graphical evidence. Figure 5 shows Kaplan-Meier
survival curves for two groups of individuals: those who received sev-moral hazard versus liquidity 211
Fig. 5.—Effect of severance pay on durations. Data are from Mathematica surveys; see
the note to table 3 for additional details on data andsampledeﬁnition.Dataarereweighted
using sampling probabilities to yield estimates for a representative sample of job losers.
Kaplan-Meier survival curves are plotted for two groups of individuals: those who received
a severance payment at the time of job loss and those who did not. Survival curves are
adjusted for the effect of preunemployment job tenure on durations by ﬁtting a Cox
model and recovering baseline hazards as described in the text.
erance pay and those who did not. Since preunemployment job tenure
is an important determinant of severance pay and is also highly positively
correlated with durations, I control for it throughout the analysis. These
survival curves have been adjusted for tenure by ﬁtting a Cox model
with tenure as the only regressor and recovering the baseline hazards
for each group. Severance pay recipients have signiﬁcantly lower job-
ﬁnding hazards. As a result, 68 percent of individuals who received
severance pay remain unemployed after 10 weeks, compared with 75
percent among those who received no severance payment.
28
An obvious concern in interpreting this result as evidence of a liquidity
effect is that it may reﬂect correlation rather than causality because
severance pay recipients differ from nonrecipients. For instance, ﬁrms
that offer severance packages might do so because their workers have
accumulated more speciﬁc human capital and are likely to take a long
time to ﬁnd a suitable new job. This would induce a spurious correlation
between severance pay and durations in the cross section.
I use three approaches to investigate the causality of severance pay.
28 This result is consistent with the ﬁndings of Kodrzycki (1998), who compares un-
employment durations among severance pay recipients and nonrecipients for a sample
of displaced workers who attended training programs.212 journal of political economy
First, I investigate whether the effect of severance pay differs across
constrained and unconstrained groups. The model in Section II indi-
cates that severance pay—which is a minor fraction of lifetime wealth—
should causally affect durations only among households that cannot
smooth consumption. In contrast, alternative explanations such as the
one proposed above would not necessarily predict a differential effect
of severance pay across constrained and unconstrained households.
Hence, the heterogeneity of the estimated severance pay effect yields
insight into the causality of severance pay.
Implementing this test requires division of households into con-
strained and unconstrained groups. Unfortunately, the Mathematica sur-
veys do not contain data on assets and the other proxies for constraint
status used in the SIPP data. To overcome this problem, I predict assets
for each household with an equation estimated using ordinary least
squares (OLS) on the SIPP sample. The prediction equation is a linear
function of age, wage, education, and marital status. I then divide house-
holds into two groups, above and below the median level of predicted
assets. Note that results based on predicted assets (using the same pre-
diction equation) and reported assets are similar in the SIPP data: the
total elasticity of duration with respect to UI beneﬁts is much larger
among households with predicted assets below the median than for
those above the median. Hence, the predicted asset measure succeeds
in identifying the households whose search behavior is sensitive to UI
beneﬁts.
Figure 6 replicates ﬁgure 5 for the two groups. Figure 6a shows that
receipt of severance pay is associated with a large increase in survival
probabilities for constrained (low-asset) households. Figure 6b shows
that severance pay has a much smaller effect on search behavior for
households that are likely to be wealthier. Results are similar if house-
holds are split into constrained and unconstrained groups on the basis
of age or income alone. Results are also unaffected by changes in the
functional form of the asset prediction equation, prediction via quantile
regression instead of OLS, or trimming of outliers. The fact that sev-
erance pay affects durations only in the group of households that are
sensitive to UI beneﬁts (those who are likely to be constrained) supports
the claim that liquidity effects drive a substantial portion of the UI-
duration link.
As a second approach to examining the causality of severance pay, I
assess the sensitivity of the severance pay effect to controlling for ob-
served heterogeneity. I estimate variants of the Cox model in (19),
censoring all durations at 50 weeks as in the SIPP data. I ﬁrst estimate
a model with only a linear tenure control and a time-varying interaction
of severance pay with weeks unemployed. I then estimate the model
with the following control set: 10-piece linear splines for log preunem-Fig. 6.—Effect of severance pay on durations: a, below median net wealth; b, above
median net wealth. See ﬁg. 5 for sample deﬁnition. Each panel is constructed in exactly
the same way as ﬁg. 5. Panel a includes observations in which predicted net wealth is
below the sample median; panel b includes those above the median.Netwealthispredicted
using a linear function of age, wage, education, and marital status that is estimated on
the core SIPP sample as described in the text.214 journal of political economy
TABLE 4
















Severance pay dummy  .179  .233
(.059) (.071)
(Net liquidity ! median) #
severance pay  .493  .457
(.086) (.099)
(Net liquidity 1 median) #
severance pay .030  .088
(.058) (.081)
(Tenure ! median) # sever-
ance pay  .099  .143
(.048) (.055)
(Tenure 1 median) # sever-
ance pay  .253  .340
(.084) (.119)
Tenure spline x x x
State, industry, and occupa-
tion ﬁxed effects x x x
Wage spline x x x
Industry, occupation, and
wage spline interactions
with net liquidity 1 median
or tenure 1 median x x
Equality of coefﬁcients p-
value ! .01 ! .01 ! .01 .03
Number of spells 2,441 2,428 2,441 2,428 2,441 2,428
Note.—Coefﬁcients reported can be interpreted as the percentage change in hazard rate associated with receipt of
severance pay. Standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. See the note to table 3 for the sample deﬁnition.
The bottom row of speciﬁcations 3–6 reports p-values from an F-test for equality of coefﬁcients across low- and high-
asset or low- and high-tenure groups. All speciﬁcations include a severance pay # spell week interaction variable to
capture time-varying effects of severance pay. Columns 1, 3, and 5 include only a linear control for tenure at the pre–
job loss employer in addition. Columns 2, 4, and 6 include the following controls in addition to those listed in the
table: age, marital status, dummies for dropout and college graduate, and log individual weekly UI beneﬁt. In speci-
ﬁcations 3 and 4, baseline hazards are stratiﬁed by net liquidity ! median. Net liquidity ! median is an indicator variable
for whether the household’s predicted assets are below the sample median. Assets are predicted using the SIPP data
as described in the text. In speciﬁcations 5 and 6, baseline hazards are stratiﬁed by tenure ! median. Tenure ! median
is an indicator variable for whether the individual’s job tenure is below 4.83 years (the median level tenure among
severance pay recipients). Industry and occupation dummies and wage splines are interacted with the stratiﬁcation
variable in cols. 4 and 6.
ployment wage and job tenure; dummies for prior industry, occupation,
and year; and controls for age, marital status, and education (using a
dummy for dropout status and college graduation). Columns 1 and 2
of table 4 show that receipt of severance pay is estimated to lower the
job-ﬁnding hazard at the beginning of the spell by percent v p  18 1
in the tenure control and percent in the full-control speci- v p  23 1
ﬁcation. The estimated value of percent (standard error 0.2 v p 1.3 2
percent) in both speciﬁcations. The effect of severance pay on search
intensity diminishes over time, as one might expect if individuals deplete
the grant over the course of the spell.moral hazard versus liquidity 215
Speciﬁcations 3 and 4 estimate separate severance pay coefﬁcients for
constrained (below-median predicted assets) and unconstrained (above-
median) households. The baseline hazards are stratiﬁed by predicted
wealth group (above/below-median), and the wage spline and industry/
occupation dummies are interacted with the predicted wealth dummy,
as in the SIPP speciﬁcations.
29 Consistent with ﬁgure 6, the estimates
indicate that severance pay reduces initial job-ﬁnding hazards in the
low-wealth group by 46–49 percent but has little or no effect in the
high-wealth group. The hypothesis that the effect of severance pay is
the same in the low- and high-wealth groups is rejected with . p ! 0.01
Predicting whether the individual is above or below median wealth di-
rectly in the ﬁrst stage and interacting the predicted probability with
the severance pay dummy when estimating the Cox model yield the
same conclusion.
Finally, as a third robustness check, I test whether larger severance
payments lead to longer unemployment durations. I implement this
intensive margin test by investigating whether the effect of severance
pay receipt differs by individuals’ job tenure. Since the severance
amount is an increasing function of job tenure, the indicator for receipt
of severance pay should have a larger effect on durations among indi-
viduals with long job tenure.
30 I divide the pooled sample (including
both severance recipients and nonrecipients) into two groups—short
and long tenure—on the basis of whether their job tenure is above or
below the median for severance recipients (4.83 years). On the basis of
data in Lee Hecht Harrison (2001), the mean severance amount con-
ditional on receipt of severance is equivalent to two weeks of wages in
the short-tenure group versus 13 weeks of wages in the long-tenure
group (see App. C).
Columns 5 and 6 of table 4 replicate speciﬁcations 3 and 4, stratifying
the baseline hazards by the short job tenure indicator and interacting
it with the severance pay indicator. For individuals who have short job
tenure, receipt of severance pay reduces initial job-ﬁnding hazards by
10–14 percent, compared with 25–34 percent for the long-tenure
group.
31 The hypothesis that the effect of severance pay is the same in
the low- and high-tenure groups is rejected with . p ! 0.03
29 Contrary to the SIPP speciﬁcations, I restrict the time interaction of severance pay
with weeks unemployed to be the same across wealth groups here in order to increase
power. Introducing an interaction yields similar point estimates but larger standard errors
because the number of severance pay recipients is relatively small.
30 Data on actual severance amounts are available for a subset of the Pennsylvania data
set. I ﬁnd a positive association between the reported amounts and durations, but the
results are not statistically signiﬁcant because of the small number of observations.
31 An alternative interpretation of speciﬁcations 5 and 6 is that tenure is used as an
instrument for the severance amount, with the direct effects of tenure on duration netted
out by comparison to the group of nonrecipients. The correlation between job tenure216 journal of political economy
Although these ﬁndings all point toward a substantial liquidity effect,
the evidence cannot be viewed as fully conclusive because the variation
in cash grants is not randomized. One might, for instance, be concerned
that low-wealth workers with job-speciﬁc capital are especially likely to
select into and stay at ﬁrms that offer severance payments, explaining
the patterns in table 4. It is reassuring that in a follow-up study that
exploits quasi-experimental variation in severance payments created by
a discontinuity in the Austrian severance pay system, Card et al. (2007)
document a substantial effect of severance pay on durations, consistent
with the evidence here. Further research along these lines is needed to
obtain more precise and compelling estimates of the liquidity effect in
the United States.
V. Calibration: Welfare Implications
I now use the hazard model estimates to calculate the average liquidity
to moral hazard ratio in the population and the average welfare gain
from raising b. Let denote the job-ﬁnding hazard in the ﬁrst week h 0
for an agent who receives the mean UI beneﬁt and does not receive b
a severance payment. Let denote the hazard for an individual who
s h1
receives the severance payment and denote the hazard for an indi-
b h1
vidual whose UI beneﬁt level is doubled. Using the approximation in
(13), we obtain
s  s  s  s  s (h   h )/h Bb 00 0 0 1 0 0 p B p , ZZ F b  a  b  A  b (h   h )/h S B 10 0
where denotes the mean weekly UI beneﬁt and denotes the mean bS
total value of the severance payment. On the basis of a survey of ﬁrms
by Lee Hecht Harrison (2001), the mean severance payment equals 10.7
weeks of wages (see App. C). At the mean beneﬁt level of , this b p 0.5w
implies ; that is, receipt of severance pay is equivalent to an S p 21.4b
annuity payment of per week for 21.4 weeks. The full-controls estimates b
from column 1 of table 2 and column 2 of table 4 imply
b h /h p 10
and . It follows that
s exp( 0.58) h /h p exp( 0.23) 10
 s  s exp( 0.23)   1 26 00 p # p 0.6. Z F  a  b exp( 0.53)   1 21.4 B
Around the level of beneﬁts observed in the data ( ), the liquidity b   0.5w
and durations is larger among severance pay recipients than among nonrecipients, which
is consistent with a liquidity effect because the severance amount rises with job tenure for
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effect accounts for roughly 60 percent of the effect of marginal changes
in the beneﬁt level on unemployment durations.
Welfare gain of UI.—To calculate , recall from speciﬁcation 1 of  D,b
table 2 that the effect of beneﬁts on the hazard rate does not vary
signiﬁcantly over the spell. From the approximation that the beneﬁt
elasticity and baseline hazard rates are constant, and D p 1/h   p D,b
.
32 Shimer and Werning (2007) report that  ( logh / logb) p 0.53 0
there are 7.7 million unemployed individuals and 135 million workers
in the United States: . With the approximation j p 135/142.7 p 0.946
that , (14) yields   p   D,bD ,b B
dW 1   jD  s  s  s   B 00 0 D ,b B (b p 0.5w) p    Z FF [( )] db j D  a  a  b j BB
1   0.946 15.8 0.6 0.53
p ##   p 0.04. () 0.946 24.3 0.4 0.946
Starting from , a $1.00 balanced-budget increase in the weekly b p 0.5w
beneﬁt level would have raised each individual’s utility by the equivalent
of a 4 cent increase in the weekly wage, or about $2.00 per year. When
we aggregate over the population, the welfare gain of raising the UI
beneﬁt level by a dollar is equivalent to an increase in GDP of $290
million. Starting from a mean beneﬁt of $200 per week, raising the
beneﬁt level by 10 percent would yield an aggregate welfare gain equiv-
alent to about $5.9 billion, roughly 0.05 percent of GDP.
It is important to recognize that these welfare gain calculations are
valid only locally around . The liquidity effect and marginal b p 0.5w
welfare gain of UI will be larger when b is low and small when b is high,
as illustrated in the numerical simulations in Section II. The local welfare
gain estimate does tell us that the optimal wage replacement rate for
UI exceeds 50 percent since . In addition, the evi- dW(b p 0.5w)/db 1 0
dence suggests that a replacement rate near 50 percent may be near
optimal since is small.
33 dW(b p 0.5w)/db
It is interesting to compare the welfare implications of the revealed
preference approach with those of previous studies. Hansen and Im-
rohoroglu (1992) ﬁnd that the optimal replacement rate is 65 percent
32 The elasticity called for in (14) includes the effect of the change int.Theestimated  D,b
elasticity does not fully include the effect of t because the variation in UI beneﬁts affects
only some agents whereas taxes are levied more broadly. This discrepancy is likely to be
quantitatively unimportant because the UI tax rate is very small ( ). In the nu- t ! 0.01w
merical simulations, the elasticities with t ﬁxed and t variable are virtually identical.
33 This calculation ignores ﬁrm layoff behavior (Feldstein 1978; Topel 1983) and general
equilibrium effects (Acemoglu and Shimer 1999). Generalizing the formula to account
for these factors would be very valuable.218 journal of political economy
if moral hazard is low but less than 10 percent if moral hazard is high
in their baseline simulation. They conclude that evidence on moral
hazard is needed to assess which case is relevant. The present paper
provides empirical evidence that the low–moral hazard case is the rel-
evant one and yields welfare implications consistent with Hansen and
Imrohoroglu’s simulation for that case. Baily (1978) and Gruber (1997)
use a consumption-based exact identiﬁcation approach to show that
using estimates of the consumption drop during  W(b p 0.5w)/ b ! 0
unemployment. Indeed, their preferred calibrations using log utility
imply an optimal beneﬁt rate close to zero. The reason for the sharp
discrepancy is that the liquidity effect estimated here is inconsistent with
the relatively low degrees of risk aversion considered by Baily and
Gruber.
34 Shimer and Werning (2007) implement their reservation wage
formula using an estimate of the sensitivity of reservation wages to ben-
eﬁts from Feldstein and Poterba (1984). They ﬁnd that a $1.00 increase
in the beneﬁt level would yield a net welfare gain equivalent to raising
GDP by $2.4 billion, four times larger than the estimate here. As Shimer
and Werning observe, the credibility of existing reservation wage elas-
ticity estimates is questionable, particularly in view of more recent evi-
dence that UI beneﬁt levels have little impact on subsequent wage rates
(e.g., Card et al. 2007; van Ours and Vodopivec 2008).
Alternative policy instruments: loans.—In the analysis above, the unem-
ployment beneﬁt is used to facilitate both intertemporal smoothing and
smoothing across states. A natural alternative instrument to resolve
credit market failures is the provision of loans or UI savings accounts
(Feldstein and Altman 1998; Shimer and Werning 2006). Although a
formal analysis of optimal policy with multiple instruments is outside
the scope of this paper, the numerical simulations can be used to gain
some insight into how much of the welfare gain of UI could be obtained
using loans.
Suppose that the government provides a loan of $G upon job loss
that must be repaid within weeks. With this loan, the agent’s budget GT
constraint is for and for . Let us A    (L   G) t   GA    Lt 1 G tT t T
compare the welfare gain from increasing the government loan by $B,
34 Recall that
  u   e  s  su (c )   u (c ) c   c 00 eu p 0.6 p   g , Z F   u  a  bu (c ) c B u
where g denotes the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion at . Gruber estimates cc /c p uu e
, which requires to be consistent with a 60 percent liquidity effect. A strength 0.9 g   5
of the formula proposed here is that it does not require estimates of risk aversion, which
could plausibly be as high as in the context of moderate shocks such as unem- g p 5
ployment but much lower in other contexts (Chetty and Szeidl 2007).moral hazard versus liquidity 219
Fig. 7.—Welfare gain from loans vs. UI beneﬁts. In this ﬁgure, the curves plot dW/db
the welfare gain of raising the UI beneﬁt b by $1.00 over the ﬁrst 26 weeks as a function
of the government loan amount. The curves plot the welfare gain of raising the dW/dG
government loan amount by as a function of the loan amount. The solid curves $B p $26
are for a long-term loan that must be repaid upon death; the dashed curves are for a 2-
year loan. All the welfare gains are exact numerical simulations that assume , A p $100 0
, and all other parameters as in ﬁg. 1. b p 0.5w
dW dJ dJ 00 p B , Z dG dG dw
with the welfare gain from raising the UI beneﬁt by $1.00 for B periods,
dW dJ dJ 00 p . Z db dG dw
Assume and all other parameters as in ﬁgure 2. The solid b p 0.5w
curves in ﬁgure 7 plot and as a function of G when the dW/ dG dW/ db
government loan has to be repaid by death ( ). The G p T p 500 T
dashed curves plot and for a short-term loan dW(G)/dG dW(G)/db
( ). G p 104 T
The simulations have three lessons. First, the welfare gains from
providing long-term liquidity can be quite large. The welfare gain of
initiating a long-term government loan when is b p 0.5w dW(G p
.T h em a r g i n a lw e l f a r eg a i no fi n c r e a s i n gb falls rapidly 0)/ dG p 0.044220 journal of political economy
with G:w h e n , i s4 0p e r c e n to ft h ev a l u eo f G p 5,000 dW/ db dW/ db
when . Substantial welfare gains can be achieved by correcting G p 0
credit market failures while leaving insurance markets incomplete
because unemployment shocks are small relative to permanent
income.
Second, short-term loans are much less valuable than long-term loans.
The marginal welfare gain of a loan that lasts for less than 11 months
is zero in this numerical example because the private market borrowing
limit ( ) begins to bind only at . The welfare gain from L p  1,000 t p 47
the 2-year loan plotted in the ﬁgure is close to the value of the per-
manent loan initially but declines rapidly as G rises. Once the loan
amount exceeds $3,600, the marginal value of the loan becomes zero
because the borrowing constraint becomes slack for . The UI t   104
beneﬁt, in contrast, retains a marginal value of because dW/ db p 0.018
consumption ﬂuctuates signiﬁcantly across states even when G 1
. Intuitively, a job loser is reluctant to take up a lot of short-term $3,600
debt even though it would help him smooth consumption because of
the risk of a long spell of unemployment (an example of precautionary
savings behavior).
The ﬁnal lesson pertains to the welfare value of using loans instead
of the existing UI system. The long-term loan generates a strictly larger
welfare gain than the UI beneﬁt because UI has an efﬁciency cost,
whereas loan provision is nondistortionary in this model. However, the
difference in the welfare gain from a $1.00 increase in b and a com-
parable increase in even the ﬁrst-best costless loan is less than 0.5 cent
of weekly wages on average. The difference is small because the moral
hazard distortion caused by UI is small in practice. It is therefore critical
to quantify the moral hazard cost of loans to determine whether loans
or subsidies for job search are a better policy to facilitate consumption
smoothing.
Other policy implications.—Recent evidence that UI does not smooth
consumption for households with high assets (e.g., Browning and Cross-
ley 2001) has been interpreted as a point in favor of means-testing
temporary income support programs. But UI does not affect unem-
ployment durations signiﬁcantly for this group either. Since means test-
ing generates a distortionary incentive to save less, a universal beneﬁt
may maximize welfare. In addition, the evidence above implies that
efforts to shorten unemployment durations through job-ﬁnding bonuses
or more stringent search requirements would yield welfare gains 60
percent smaller than suggested by prior studies that attributed the entire
duration response to a substitution effect.moral hazard versus liquidity 221
VI. Conclusion
This paper has proposed and implemented an “exact identiﬁcation”
approach to welfare analysis. In particular, I showed that the welfare
gain from increasing the unemployment beneﬁt level can be well ap-
proximated by estimating a pair of high-level elasticities rather than
identifying the full set of primitives. The central intuition is that UI
beneﬁts affect search behavior through two channels: a welfare-
enhancing “liquidity effect” and a welfare-reducing moral hazard effect.
The ratio of the liquidity effect to the moral hazard effect is a sufﬁcient
statistic for the welfare gain of raising the beneﬁt level in a general
environment. Using data from the United States, I estimate that the
liquidity effect accounts for 60 percent of the marginal effect of UI
beneﬁts on durations at current beneﬁt rates. This estimate implies that
a beneﬁt equal to 50 percent of the preunemployment wage is near
optimal in a UI system that pays constant beneﬁts for 6 months.
Although this paper has focused on unemployment, the theoretical
concepts have broader applicability. Revealed preference can be used
to calculate the welfare gains from social and private insurance policies
by separating moral hazard and liquidity effects. For example, one can
calculate the value of a health insurance program by estimating the
extent to which an agent’s medical expenditures would differ if he were
paid a lump-sum beneﬁt rather than an indemnity beneﬁt that covers
health expenses. This method does not require data on the outcomes
of insurance provision, such as health, consumption, or job match qual-
ity, which have proved to be difﬁcult to measure.
35
More generally, developing exact identiﬁcation strategies to analyze
optimal policy in contexts beyond insurance should be a high priority
for further work. Such strategies offer the promise of combining the
best feature of reduced-form empirical analysis—transparent and cred-
ible identiﬁcation—with the beneﬁt of structural models—the ability to
make precise statements about welfare.
Appendix A
Proofs
Derivation of the Decomposition in (9)
For any variable and , let x   {a, b, w} s   T
s  y  y
p  F  x  x tp0 s t
35 See Nyman (2003) and Autor and Duggan (2007) for evidence on moral hazard vs.
liquidity effects in health and disability insurance.222 journal of political economy
denote the effect of increasing x in all periods 0 to s on y. Then it follows that
 s 1  V  U 00 0 p   . (A1) F    FF ()  x w (s )  x  x ss s 0
Note that because UI beneﬁts and the annuity last for only ( s / b) F p  s / b 0 B 0
B periods by assumption. Exploiting the envelope conditions from agent opti-
mization, we obtain the following derivatives for the value functions:
t B 1  U0   u   u p u(c )  (1  s)u(c ),    0 it  b ip1 tp1
 V0 p 0,
 b
t B 1  U0   e   e p s (B 1)v (c )  (1  s )s(B t)v (c ),    11 i 1 tt F []  w ip2 tp2 B
 V0   e p Bv (c ), 0 F  w B
 U  U  U 00 0 p   , FF  a  b  w BB
 V  V 00 p . FF  a  w BB
From these expressions and equation (A1), it follows that
 s  s  s 00 0 p   . FF  b  a  w BB
Proof of Proposition 1
To begin, observe that the unconditionalaveragemarginalutilityofconsumption
while employed over the ﬁrst B periods is
t B 1 1   e   e   e Ev (c ) p s Bv (c )  (1  s )s(B t)v (c )    0,B 1 t 00 i 1 tt {[ ] } B D ip1 tp1 B
1  U  V 00 p (1  s )  s . 00 FF [] B D  w  w BB Bmoral hazard versus liquidity 223
The average marginal utility of consumption while employed conditional on
ﬁnding a job in period 0 is
1 V0   e   e Ev (c ) p v (c ) p . 0,B 10 0 F B  w B
To derive (14), recall that . Therefore, J p (1  s )U (b, t) sV (b, t) w(s ) 00 0 0 0
dJ  U  Ud t  Vd t 00 0 0 p (1  s )    s 00 () db  b  wd b  wdb
 sd t 0      e p  (1  s )w   (T D)Ev (c ). (A2) 00 , T 1 t  bd b
Next, I normalize the expression for by the expected welfare gain from dJ / db 0
increasing the wage by $1.00, :
  e dJ / dw p (T D)Ev (c ) 00 , T 1 t
 W dJ dJ 11  s  sd t 00 0 0    pp   w   . Z   e  b db dw T DE v(c )  bd b 0,T 1 t
Using (A1) and the deﬁnitions of and , we obtain
  e   e Ev (c ) Ev (c ) 0,B 10 0 , B 1 t
 s 11 0   e   e p [Bv (c ) (B D )Ev (c )]. 0 B 0,B 1 t F     w w 1 s B 0
This expression implies that
  e   e   e  s  sD Ev (c ) B[v (c ) Ev (c )] 00 B 0,B 1 t 00 , B 1 t p . Z F   e   e   e  w  wD Ev (c ) T[v (c ) Ev (c )] B 0,T 1 t 00 , T 1 t
When the preceding equations are combined, some algebra yields
  e   e   e dW D E v (c ) v (c ) BE v (c )  s / ad t B 0,B 1 t 00 , B 1 t 0 p     1   .   e   e [] [ ] db T DE v (c ) DE v (c )(  s / w) F db 0,T 1 tB 0,T 1 t 0 B
Differentiating the government’s budget constraint, we obtain
dt DD B p 1      . D ,bD ,b () B db T DT  D
Plugging this expression into the formula for above and collecting terms dW/ db
yields (14). QED.
Extension 1: Ex Ante Behavior
The main steps of the proof are the same as in proposition 1. I ﬁrst write
in terms of marginal utilities as in (10) and then show how this repre- dW/ db
sentation can be linked to and —effects of a and [( s / a) F ]FA , z ( s / b) FA , z 0 B 00 0
b on holding and z ﬁxed. Recall that sA 00
T 1 dW dJ dJ  1  1 { .   Z db db dw tp 1 t224 journal of political economy
Computing these derivatives explicitly gives
A  q(z)   w 0 t dJ dt dt dJ  1 0   e   p  v (c )  (1  p) Tv  t  p ()  1 db db T db db
A  q(z)   w 0 t dt dt   e   p  v (c )  (1  p) Tv  t ()  1 db T db
 U  Ud t  Vd t 00 0  p (1  s )    s , 00 () []  b  wd b  wd b
T 1 dJ 1   e p (T 1 pD)Ev (c ).   0,T 1 t dw tp 1 t
When the approximation that for all t is used, these expressions
  e   e v (c ) p v (c ) t 0
simplify to
dJ  Ud t  10   e p p(1  s )   (T 1 pD)v (c ), 00 db  bd b
T 1 dJ 1   e p (T 1 pD)v (c )   0 dw tp 1 t
dW p(1  s )  Ud t 00   e   p v (c )  . Z 0 db T 1 pD  bd b
This marginal-utility representation is analogous to equation (A1) in the proof
of proposition 1. To rewrite this equation in terms of moral hazard and liquidity
effects, consider the following comparative statics:
 s 1  U 00 A , z p   , 0 F     b w  b
 s 1  V  U 1  U 11 00 0 0   e A , z p   p    Dv(c ). 0 Bt FF    FF       () ( )  a w  a  a w  b w 1 s BB B 0
Combining these equations, one can easily see that
 s0   A , z 0 F  a  U0   e 1  p (1  s ) v (c ). Z 0 t  b
 s  s 00 A , z  A , z 00 FF  a  b
Differentiating the government’sbudgetconstraintandusingtheapproximation
, we obtain   p   D,bD ,b B
dt pD T 1 B p 1    . D ,b () B db T 1 pD T 1 pDmoral hazard versus liquidity 225
Finally, plugging these expressions into the formula for above and col- dW/ db
lecting terms yields
dW 1 jD   BD ,b B p R  , () db j D j
where and j p (T 1 pD)/(T 1)
 s0   A , z 0 FF ()  a B
R p
 s  s 00 A , z  A , z 00 FF F ()  a  b B
is the liquidity to moral hazard ratio, with ex ante behaviors held ﬁxed.
Extension 2: Stochastic Wage Offers
Suppose that with probability (controlled by search intensity) the agent is st
offered a wage . Assume no recall of previous offers and indepen- w   w  F(w) m
dent and identically distributed draws across periods. The agent follows a res-
ervation wage policy: in each period t, there is a threshold such that the agent Rt
accepts a job only if the wage (McCall 1970). I generalize corollary 1 to w 1 Rt
this model in the following steps: (1) specify the value functions, (2) write the
marginal welfare gain from raising b in terms of expected marginal utilities, and
(3) relate the gap in marginal utilities to the comparative statics of search in-
tensity. For simplicity, assume . B p T
The value function for an individual with assets who ﬁnds and accepts a At
job at the beginning of period t that pays a wage w is
V(w, A ) p maxv(A  A  w) V (w, A ). tt t t  1 t 1 t 1
A  L t 1
The value function for an individual who fails to ﬁnd a job at the beginning of
period t and remains unemployed is
U(A ) p maxu(A  A  b) J (A ), tt t t  1 tt  1 t 1
A  L t 1
where is the value of entering period unemployed with assets A. J (A ) t 1 t 1 t 1
The probability of ﬁnding and accepting a job in period t is , where sP (w   R ) tt
. It follows that
  P(w   R ) p dF(w)  R t t





EV p E[V(w, A ) Fw   R ] p [V(w, A )]dw tt t t   tt P(w   R ) tR t
represents the expected value of being employed conditional on receiving an226 journal of political economy
acceptable offer. Let in what follows. The marginal welfare gain P p P(w   R ) 0
from raising the UI beneﬁt is
dJ  Ud t  U  EV 00 0 0 p (1  Ps )   (1  Ps )  Ps . 00 0 [] db  bd b  w  w mm
The marginal welfare gain of raising the wage by $1.00 in all states and periods
is
dJ  U  EV 00 0   e p (1  Ps )  Ps p (T D)Ev (c ), (A3) 00 t dw  w  w mm m
where denotes the average marginal utility of consumption while em-
  e Ev (c ) t
ployed. The latter equality follows from differentiating the value functions and
exploiting the envelope conditions for and , as in the derivation of (9) sR tt
above.
When these equations are combined, the money-metric measure for the wel-
fare gain from raising b is
dW dJ dJ  Ud t 00 0   e pp (1  Ps )( T D)Ev (c )  . ZZ 0 t db db dw  bd b m
To write this expression in terms of the liquidity and moral hazard effects on
search intensity, note that the ﬁrst-order condition for is s0
  PEV (A , a) PU (A , a, b) p w(s ), 00 00 0
which is a simple generalization of (4), replacing the value function V with its
expected value and integrating over the wage distribution. Differentiating the
ﬁrst-order condition yields the following comparative statics:
 s  U 00    p  P w (s ), Z 0  b  b
 s  EV  U 00 0    p P   w (s ), Z 0 ()  a  a  a
 s  EV  U 00 0    p P   w (s ). Z 0 ()  w  w  w mm m
If the agent ﬁnds a job in period 0, the average marginalutilityofconsumption
(integrating over the wage distribution) is . From (A3), it
  e  EV / w p TEv (c ) 0 m 0
follows that
  e   e  U (T D)Ev (c ) Ps Tv (c ) 0 t 00 p .
 w 1 Ps m 0
Hence the effect of raising the wage in all states and periods by $1.00 on search
intensity is
  e   e  s (T D)Ev (c ) Ps Tv (c ) 0 t 00   e    p PT E v(c )  w (s ). Z 00 []  w 1 Ps m 0
To simplify this expression, make the approximation that the average marginalmoral hazard versus liquidity 227
utility of consumption is constant over time, that is, . This ap-
  e   e Ev (c ) p Ev (c ) 0 t
proximation implies
  e  sP D E v (c ) 0 t p .     w w 1 Ps m 0
Using the expressions for and , we obtain  s / b  s / w 00 m
   dW (1  Ps )[w (s ) s / b]/PD d t 00 0 p    .    db (1  Ps )[w (s ) s / w ]/PT Dd b 00 0 m
Differentiating the government’s budget constraint yields
dt DT
p 1   . D,b () db T DT  D
Plugging in this expression and collecting terms, we obtain
dW 1 j  s / a   0 D ,b B p    , (A4) [] db j ( s / a) ( s / b) j 00
which is precisely the same formula as in corollary 1.
The problem in implementing (A4) empirically is that the reemployment
hazard in period t is . Therefore, changes in that are observed h p s[1  F(R )] h tt t t
in the data cannot be directly mapped to changes in . To address this problem, st
note that the expected accepted wage is
 
wdF(w) tt w p E[wFw 1 R ] p . tt t   t 1 F(R ) Rt t
Letting the density of the wage distribution be denoted by , we have f(w)
 wt f(R ) t p (w  R ) . (A5) t t  R 1 F(R ) tt
For any variable , the effect of a change in x on the average accepted x   {a, b}
wage is
 wt f(R )  R tt p (w  R ). t t  x 1 F(R )  x t
The effect of a change in x on the reemployment hazard in period t is
 logh  logsf (R )  R tt t t p   . (A6)
 x  x 1 F(R )  x t
Combining these equations yields
 wt  logs 1  logh tt p   .
 x  x  x w  Rt t228 journal of political economy
Finally, plugging this expression with and into (A4) gives x p ax p b
 w0 dW 1 j 1  logh 0 p    {( ) db j  a  a w  R 0 0
 w  w 00 1  logh 1  logh   00 D ,b B          . (A7) [( ) ( )] }  a  a  b  b j w  Rw  R 00 00
This formula shows that one can calculate when wage offers are stochastic dW/ db
using information about the reservation wage and the effect of beneﬁts and R 0
cash grants on mean accepted wages. If and , (A7) col-  x / A p 0  x / b p 0 t 0 t
lapses back to
dW 1 j  h / a   0 D ,b B p    , [] db j ( h / a) ( h / b) j 00
which is exactly the formula implemented in Section V.
Extension 3: Heterogeneity
For simplicity, consider the baseline model with . Suppose that the econ- T p 1
omy has N individuals, indexed by i. Let , , and denote the consumption uv w ii i
utility functions of agent i. Let denote initial assets and denote the wage.
ii Aw 00
The government’s objective is to maximize the sum of the agent’s expected
utilities subject to the constraint that total beneﬁts paid equal totals taxes col-
lected in expectation:
N
ii i i i i ˜ maxW(b ) p {[1 s (b )]u(A  b ) s (b )v(A  w  t) w(s (b ))}   00 0 i 00 0 0 i 00 i 00
ip1 b0
NN
ii subject to b [1  s (b )] p t s (b ).    00 0 0 0
ip1 ip1
Let denote mean search intensity in the population,
N i Es p  s /N 00 ip1
NN
  ui   ui Eu(c ) p (1  s )u (c )( 1  s )    Z 00 i 0,i 0
ip1 ip1
denote mean marginal utility for those who are unemployed, and
NN
  ei   ei Ev (c ) p sv(c ) s    Z 00 i 0,i 0
ip1 ip1
denote mean marginal utility for those who are employed. It is straightforward
to establish that
NN ˜ dW dt i   ui   e p (1  s )u (c )  sv(c )    0 i 0,i 0 i 0,i db db ip1 ip1 00
dt   u   e p N(1  Es )Eu(c ) NEs Ev(c ). 00 0 0 db0moral hazard versus liquidity 229
The marginal welfare gain of raising the wage rate by $1.00 for all agents is
. Note that
N i   e   e   sv(c ) p Es Ev (c ) 0 i 0,i 00 ip1
dt 1 Es 1 dEs 00 p   b . 0 2 db Es (Es ) db 00 0 0
Then it follows that
  u   e ˜ dW dW 1 Es Eu(c ) Ev (c )   00 0 E1 s,b   e 0 p Es Ev (c ) p N   , Z 00   e [] db db Es Ev (c ) Es 00 0 0 0
where
d(1  Es ) b 00   p E1 s,b0 db 1 Es 00
denotes the elasticity of the average fraction of time spent unemployed with
respect to . This equation is analogous to (10), showing that the per capita b0
welfare gain from increasing can be expressed in terms of average marginal b0
utilities when there is heterogeneity in the population.
To relate this expression to liquidity and moral hazard effects, observe that
the ratio of the mean liquidity effect to the mean moral hazard effect is
ii   e   u   e E s / Av (c ) u (c ) v (c ) 00 i 0,ii 0,ii 0,i R pp EE . Z ii    i    i [] [ ] E s / w w (s ) w (s ) 00 i 0 i 0
If the heterogeneity in the population is such that and
  e    i v (c )   w (s ) i 0,i 0
,
  u    i u (c )   w (s ) i 0,i 0
  u   e Eu(c ) Ev (c ) 00 R p   e Ev (c ) 0
and the per capita welfare gain is
dW 1 Es   0 E1 s,b0 N p R  . Z () db Es Es 00 0
This expression coincides with (11), except that all the moments are replaced
by population means. An analogous independence assumption and derivation
following the proof of proposition 1 can be used to extend this result to
. T 1 1
Appendix B
SIPP Sample and Variable Deﬁnitions
The data used in Section III are from the 1985, 1986, 1987, 1990, 1991, 1992,
1993, and 1996 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation. The
SIPP collected information from a sample of approximately 13,000 households
in 1985 that grew over time to over 36,000 households in 1996. Interviews were
conducted every 4 months for a period of 2–4 years, so the data span the
beginning of 1985 to the middle of 2000.
Pooling the eight panels yield a universe of 468,766 individuals from 149,286
households. Of these individuals, 99,880 experience at least one job separation
(as deﬁned below) during the sample period. Further restricting the sample to230 journal of political economy
individuals between the ages of 18 and 65 who have at least 3 months of work
history and have been included in the panel for at least 3 months leaves 78,168
individuals. Because of a problematic deﬁnition of unemployment status in the
1985–87 versions of the SIPP, individuals sometimes report a jobseparationwhile
also reporting unemployment duration equal to zero. Redeﬁning unemploy-
ment status to include only those who report becoming unemployed and also
a nonzero unemployment duration leaves 65,135 individuals.
I drop observations from Maine, Vermont, Iowa, North Dakota, SouthDakota,
Alaska, Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming because the SIPP does not provide
unique state identiﬁers for individuals residing in these small states. This leaves
me with a sample of 62,598 individuals and 86,921 unemployment spells. Of
these spells, 33,149 are for women, whom I exclude. I also keep only those
individuals who report actively searching for a job, as deﬁned below, to eliminate
those who have dropped out of the labor force. This leaves a sample of 16,784
individuals(3.6 percent ofthe originalsample)whoexperiencedatotalof21,796
unemployment spells. Next, I drop individuals who are temporarily laid off,
since they may not have been actively searching for a new job, leaving 21,107
spells. I then exclude individuals who never received UI beneﬁts, leaving 7,015
spells. Finally, I further limit the sample to individuals who take up beneﬁts
within the ﬁrst month after job loss because it is unclear how UI should affect
hazards for individuals who delay take-up. This last step produces a core sample
consisting of 4,015 individuals (0.86 percent of the original sample) and 4,560
unemployment spells, of which 4,337 have asset and mortgage information.
Measurement of unemployment durations.—The measurement of unemployment
durations in the SIPP differs from conventional measures because it requires
the tabulation of responses to questions about employment at the weekly level.
In particular, the SIPP reports the employment status of every individual over
15 years old for every week that they are in the sample. Weekly employment
status (ES) can take the following values:
1. with a job this week—working
2. with a job, not on layoff, but absent without pay
3. with a job, but on layoff
4. no job—looking for work
5. no job—not looking for work
A job separation is deﬁned as a change in ES from 1 or 2 to 3, 4, or 5. Following
Cullen and Gruber (2000), I compute the duration of unemployment by sum-
ming the number of consecutive weeks that , starting at the date of job ES   3
separation and stopping when the individual ﬁnds a job that lasts for at least 1
month (i.e., reports a string of four consecutive or ). Individuals ES p 1 ES p 2
are deﬁned as being on temporary layoff if they report at any point in ES p 3
the spell. They are deﬁned as “searching” if they report at any point ES p 4
during their spell.
Prediction of individual-level unemployment beneﬁts.—I estimate a ﬁrst-stage equa-
tion for earnings using OLS on the full sample of individuals who report a job
loss at some point during the sample period. I regress nominal log wages in the
year before job loss on years of education; age at job loss; years of tenure on
the last job; a dummy for left-censoring of this job tenure variable; industry,
occupation, month, and year dummies; and the unemployment rate in the
relevant state/year. Since many individuals in the sample do not have a full
year’s earning’s history before a job separation, I deﬁne the annual income of
these individuals by assuming that they earned the average wage they reportmoral hazard versus liquidity 231
before they began participating in the SIPP. For example, individuals with one
quarter of wage history are assumed to have an annual income of four times
that quarter’s income. Using the coefﬁcient estimates, I predict log wages for
each job loser and recover the predicted wage in levels. I then use this predicted
wage to simulate the claimant’s unemployment beneﬁt using the UI beneﬁt
calculator under the assumption that wages are constant over the “base period”
(typically the ﬁve quarters before job loss).
Note that simulating beneﬁts using individuals’ actual reported wage histories
rather than the predicted wages yields a distribution of unemployment beneﬁt
levels that has much higher variance and a much weaker correlation with du-
rations in the full sample. The predicted wage measure smooths the reported
income ﬂuctuations by isolating permanent differences in income correlated
with stable characteristics such as education. Reassuringly, when the sample is
restricted to observations in which the deviation between the predicted wage
and actual reported wage is small (e.g., ! 25 percent), the point estimates for
the speciﬁcations in table 2 obtained are similar to those obtained in the full
sample.
Appendix C
Mathematica Sample and Variable Deﬁnitions
The data for the analysis in Section V come from two surveys conducted by
Mathematica on behalf of the Department of Labor, matchedwithadministrative
data from state UI records. The data sets are publicly available through the
Upjohn Institute. The ﬁrst data set is the Pennsylvania Reemployment Bonus
Demonstration, which contains information on 5,678 durations for a represen-
tative sample of job losers in Pennsylvania in 1991. This data set contains in-
formation on prior wages, weeks of UI paid, as well as demographic character-
istics, household income, job characteristics (tenure, occupation, industry), and
receipt of severance pay. The second data set is the Study of Unemployment
Insurance Exhaustees, which contains data on the unemployment durations of
3,907 individuals who claimed UI beneﬁts in 1998. This data set is a sample of
unemployment durations in 25 states of the United States, with oversampling
of individuals who exhausted UI beneﬁts. The information in the data set is
similar to that in the Pennsylvania study. Combining the two data sets yields a
pooled sample containing 9,585 individuals. Note that Pennsylvania is not in-
cluded in the exhaustees study, and hence there is only one year of data for
each state in the sample.
For comparability, I make the same exclusions as in the SIPP. First, I include
only prime-age males, dropping 44.7 percent of the original sample. Second, I
exclude temporary layoffs by discarding all individuals who expected a recall at
the time of layoff, dropping an additional 24.8 percent of the original sample.
Finally, I drop all individuals with missing data on severance payments, years of
job tenure, reported survey durations, or the variables used to predict net liquid
wealth, losing another 5 percent of the original sample. These exclusions leave
2,441 individuals in the sample.
Consistent with the SIPP deﬁnition, I measure unemployment durations as
the number of weeks elapsed from the end of the individual’s prior job to the
start of his next job as reported in the Mathematica survey.
Calculation of mean severance amounts.—Lee Hecht Harrison (2001) reports
results from a survey of severance pay policies of human resource executives at232 journal of political economy
925 corporations in the United States in 2001. At companies where the severance
amount is based on years of service (which is the most common practice), the
report provides a tabulation of the number of weeks of severance provided per
week of service (see their table 1 in sec. II, p. 4). Using the percentages reported
in this table for “nonexempts” (hourlyworkers)andcodingthe !1weekcategory
as 0.5 week, I compute that, on average, individuals receive 1.35 weeks of sev-
erance pay per year of service. Lee Hecht Harrison reports that severance pay
is typically capped at 26 weeks (6 months) for hourly workers. Deﬁning the
severance amount for each individual as min(1.35 # job tenure, 26), I compute
that the average severance pay recipient in the Mathematica sample receives
weeks of wages in severance pay. The average severance pay 7.77#1.35 p 10.68
amounts for the low-tenure and high-tenure groups discussed in Section IV are
calculated using analogous methods.
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